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This report summarizes the results ofPublic Citizen’s eight-month examina-
tion of the use of binding mandatory arbi-
tration by the credit card industry. Due to
widespread anecdotal evidence of abuse,
we particularly focused on credit card
giant MBNA’s reliance on one arbitration
company, the National Arbitration Forum
(NAF). This report shows that binding
mandatory arbitration is a rigged game in
which justice is dealt from a deck stacked
against consumers. 
Consumers are railroaded into arbitration
even if their identity was stolen or they
never agreed to take disputes to arbitra-
tion. In several cases we uncovered, NAF,
which routinely handles MBNA’s “collec-
tion” arbitrations, ignored repeated con-
sumer protests that identity theft was the
source of the alleged debt.
In fact, we found that NAF is today the
credit card industry’s go-to dispenser of
swift decisions against its customers. The
Forum and other arbitration providers ob-
sessively enshroud their work in secrecy.
Yet the state of California in 2003 opened
a small window into this seedy world by
requiring arbitration providers to furnish
some limited data on their own corporate
Web sites on each consumer arbitration
case they handle. Even this information is
obscured by the arbitration firms, which
post the records in a manner that makes it
difficult to see patterns and analyze re-
sults.
For the first time, we have comprehen-
sively crunched data for the nearly 34,000
cases contained in NAF’s California re-
ports. We found the following:
• Enormous Numbers of Affected
Consumers:With more than 1,600
part-time arbitrators on its national ros-
ter, NAF admits to handling more than
50,000 cases a year.2 In California
alone, NAF handled 34,000 consumer
arbitrations between Jan. 1, 2003, and
March 31, 2007.
• Substantial Use of Binding Manda-
tory Arbitration by the Credit Card
Industry: NAF identified virtually all
of its California cases as “collection”
cases filed against consumers by credit
card companies or firms that buy debts
from these companies for cents on the
dollar. Fifty-three percent of those
cases involved MBNA credit card
holders.
• Corporations – not Consumers –
Choose Binding Mandatory Arbitra-
tion:All but 118 of the cases were
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“If arbitration were in any way beneficial to
consumers, it could be made an option and 
consumers would choose it.”
Richard Alderman,
Director, Consumer Law Center
University of Houston Law Center1
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filed against consumers by credit
card/finance companies or firms that
purchase their debts. In other words,
consumers chose to bring only 118
cases before NAF while corporations
chose this business friendly forum
nearly 34,000 times – 99.6 percent of
the total cases.
• Stunning Results that Disfavor Con-
sumers: In the more than 19,000 cases
in which an NAF-appointed arbitrator
was involved, 94 percent of decisions
were for business.
• Biased Decision-makers:Arbitrators
have a strong financial incentive to
rule in favor of the companies that file
cases against consumers because they
can make hundreds of thousands of
dollars a year conducting arbitrations.
The arbitrators are chosen by the arbi-
tration firms hired by MBNA and other
corporations, which are unlikely to
pick arbitration firms that produce re-
sults they do not like. Arbitrators rou-
tinely charge $400 or more an hour.
Top arbitrators can charge up to
$10,000 per day and some make $1
million a year. In comparison, Califor-
nia Superior Court judges earn
$171,648.3
• The Busiest Arbitrators Produce the
Results Corporations Seek: In Cali-
fornia, a small, busy cadre of 28 arbi-
trators handled nearly 9 out of every
10 NAF cases. This group ruled for
businesses 95 percent of the time. An-
other 120 arbitrators handled slightly
more than 10 percent of the cases in
which an arbitrator was assigned. They
ruled for businesses 86 percent of the
time and for consumers 10 percent.
Outside of California, there is no infor-
mation that would allow consumers to
even begin to assess the bias of an ar-
bitrator. 
• A Race to the Bottom for Arbitra-
tion Firms: Companies track how ar-
bitrators rule, and do not choose
arbitrators who do not rule in their
favor. One NAF arbitrator, a Harvard
law professor, was blackballed after
she awarded $48,000 to a consumer in
a case in which a credit card company
filed a claim against the consumer.
After the same credit card company
had her removed from other pending
cases, she resigned, citing NAF’s “ap-
parent systematic bias in favor of the
financial services industry.”
• A Process Shrouded in Secrecy: NAF
is so keen to hide its work from the
public and limit information about its
decisions that its arbitrators do not
generally issue a written decision un-
less one of the parties specifically re-
quests and pays for it in advance. In
one case examined by Public Citizen,
the cost of a three-page decision was
$1,500. 
• A Lack of Due Process Safeguards:
NAF also limits the access of parties in
arbitration to key information that they
would be allowed to obtain in court.
And the sad state of the law makes it
nearly impossible for consumers to ap-
peal adverse decisions by arbitrators. 
This report also takes a close look at the
handiwork of a few significant arbitrators.
What we found was troubling. 
For example, one arbitrator, Joseph Nar-
dulli is a pro-business lawyer who handled
1,332 arbitrations. He signed arbitration
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awards on 97 days spread over a 46-month
period, sometimes signing dozens of deci-
sions in a single day. He appears to make
decisions in most cases based solely on
documents supplied by the credit card
company. He ruled for business 97 percent
of the time (in 1,292 cases), awarding cor-
porate interests $15 million, and for the
consumer only 1.6 percent of the time (in
21 cases). (The remaining 19 cases on his
docket were claims against MBNA card-
holders that settled without a monetary
award to either side.)
On his busiest day, Nardulli signed 68 ar-
bitration decisions, awarding credit card
companies and debt buyers every penny of
the nearly $1 million they demanded. 
This Introduction explores how millions of
consumers are trapped in contracts with
businesses and summarizes the serious de-
ficiencies in the arbitration process for
consumers, including the lack of due
process. Throughout the report are case
studies of BMA victims.
Chapter One presents our findings from an
investigation of the California data and
provides compelling evidence of the un-
fairness of arbitration to consumers.
Chapter Two gives a brief history of the
move to pre-dispute BMA and proves that
at every turn, the system is stacked in
favor of corporate interests. Congressional
action and the influence of money in poli-
tics on consumer protection legislation are
discussed in Chapter Three.
The last chapter provides a short list of
consumer tips for those caught up in the
BMA web. Finally, the appendices provide
the raw data underlying some of our find-
ings; the remainder of the evidence can be
found in database form on Public Citizen’s
Web site at www.citizen.org. 
In sum, we found that the privatization of
our justice system through pre-dispute
BMA is being pushed by business interests
well aware of its perils for consumers.
BMA is, in fact, a deliberate strategy to
substitute a secret, pro-business kangaroo
court for an open trial on the merits of a
claim. The courts provide little protection
from this increasing threat. 
Bills now pending in Congress in both the
House and Senate would do much to rem-
edy this unhappy situation for consumers.
Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) and Rep.
Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) recently introduced
legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007 (S. 1782 and H.R. 3010, respec-
tively) to fix the problem. This report pro-
vides both the data and the stories that
show why consumers and policy-makers
should support this common-sense solu-
tion and restore the rights and freedoms of
millions of Americans.
How Consumers Are Trapped by the
Fine Print
Today, just about every American who has
a credit card, builds a house, has a cell
phone, gets a job or buys a computer has
likely unknowingly agreed to settle any
dispute through binding mandatory arbi-
tration (BMA), a for-profit backroom
process of settling disputes. This report
takes a close look at the credit card indus-
try’s abuse of BMA and provides a chilling
account of a stealth campaign by big busi-
ness to undermine the ability of ordinary
Americans to seek justice in court. 
These days, most Americans owe more
than they own. Credit card debt has been
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mounting and is estimated to be close to
$800 billion of consumers’ $900 billion in
revolving debt.4A recent film, “Maxed
Out,” depicted a national crisis in credit
card industry abuses. So what happens
when mistakes are made and the customer
has been wronged?
Many consumers will find themselves
forced into the shadowy world of binding
mandatory arbitration, where their chances
of successfully defending themselves are
slim to none. Public Citizen found that in a
sample of nearly 19,300 California cases
decided by one arbitration firm, consumers
prevailed in 4 percent of the cases, while
companies prevailed in 94 percent. (The
prevailing party was not listed in the re-
maining cases.) 
Binding mandatory arbitration is wholly
distinct from post-dispute arbitration, non-
binding arbitration and mediation or other
forms of alternative dispute resolution,
particularly because agreements to use
them are made after a dispute arises, not
before and as a condition of receiving the
good or service. 
Binding mandatory arbitration is big busi-
ness. Binding mandatory arbitration
clauses are found in most boilerplate con-
tracts for everyday needs, including auto
insurance, as well as nursing homes or
other services like cable television. To re-
ceive a good or service, the consumer
must sign the contract. According to a
legal brief filed by the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States in a 2006
Supreme Court case, BMA clauses are in
millions of consumer contracts across the
United States.5
Many consumers would be shocked to
learn that a binding mandatory arbitration
clause buried in the fine print strips them
of their constitutional right to a trial by
jury and an impartial judge.
How is the system rigged? First, credit
card and other companies drive millions of
dollars in business to arbitration firms,
which in turn hire arbitrators to rubber-
stamp rulings that favor business and then
pass many of the costs onto the consumer.
The evidence proves that BMA stacks the
deck to favor corporate interests over con-
sumers.
The method is to isolate and conquer, as
the cloak of secrecy makes it impossible to
see the full picture of corporate wrongdo-
ing or to use the public courts to stop it. 
Safeguards built into the justice system are
not found in binding mandatory arbitra-
tion. For example, arbitrators decide most
credit card cases on the basis of documents
supplied by the company without the pres-
ence – and sometimes without the knowl-
edge – of the consumer. Consumers must
pay to have a hearing. Hearings are not
open to the public, no transcripts are pro-
duced and, unless one of the parties specif-
ically asks – and typically pays an extra
fee – written explanations of decisions
often are not provided. Even when written
decisions are provided, they are not public,
which means that consumers cannot learn
how or why arbitrators ruled in other
cases. And appeal is nearly impossible.
Core principles like the right to discovery
of information about the case are severely
limited, and due process flies out the win-
dow. Instead, for-profit arbitration firms
like NAF make up the rules and then
choose when to apply them – usually to
consumers’ detriment. 
How the Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers
Public Citizen September 2007
4
This is a deeply unfair end-run around the
public courts and our civil justice system.
This Public Citizen report contains many
compelling stories describing the plight of
consumers caught in the web of BMA.
Even those who found justice at the end
had to fight their way through years of
costly battles before being vindicated. 
And the secrecy about this widespread
practice is nearly absolute. The data in this
report were indefensibly difficult to un-
cover. Only one state, California, requires
arbitration firms to reveal any information
at all about their use of arbitration and the
win-lose rate of corporations and con-
sumers. The data are maintained by arbi-
tration providers on their own Web sites,
where they are stored in thousands of un-
wieldy individual records. For example,
NAF posts quarterly reports about its Cali-
fornia work in a hard-to-find place on its
Web site, using a very cumbersome format
that makes analysis difficult. For the first
time, with this report we are making these
data publicly available in an easily search-
able and downloadable format. (Available
at www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/arbitra-
tion/NAFCalifornia.xls.)
Although billed as a neutral alternative
that is cheaper and more efficient than the
courts, BMA is in fact weighted heavily in
favor of companies that pick the arbitra-
tion provider. While providers publicly
tout arbitration as good for consumers,
they market their services to major corpo-
rations as a cost-reduction program for
them. These clear commercial ties be-
tween arbitration providers and corporate
interests produce a “repeat player” bias
that leaves consumers out in the cold.
How Credit Card Companies – and the
National Arbitration Forum – Pursue
Consumers with BMA
Public Citizen’s investigation found that
BMA clauses are used by major credit card
companies, and most notably by MBNA,
to collect consumer debts.a MBNA fre-
quently uses the services of one particular
arbitration provider, the National Arbitra-
tion Forum. This small for-profit Min-
nesota company has become a major
player over the last decade in the efforts of
corporations to keep disputes with cus-
tomers and employees out of court and in
binding mandatory arbitration.
NAF, which also calls itself “The Forum,”
is arguably the most notoriously unfair of
the few major companies that sell binding
mandatory arbitration services nationally.
While many prominent and respected
lawyers are included on NAF’s roster, its
Minnesota staff steers the vast majority of
its cases to a very small number of hand-
picked arbitrators. Naturally, these arbitra-
tors have a financial incentive to move
quickly through as many cases as possible. 
In 1999, an attorney for what is now part
of JPMorgan Chase described NAF in
handwritten notes as “appearing to be a
‘creditor’s tool’,” according to an antitrust
lawsuit filed in federal court in 2005.6
The California disclosures and documents
unearthed in court cases provide a small
window into the firm’s operations, sug-
gesting that NAF effectively acts as some-
thing like a debt collection agency.
Between Jan. 1, 2003, and March 31,
2007, NAF handled nearly 34,000 con-
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a Bank of America acquired MBNA for $34.2 billion in 2006. MBNA’s name was changed officially to FIA
Card Services Inc. In this report, Public Citizen refers to the credit card firm as MBNA because virtually all
documents and Web-based material we used referred to the firm as MBNA.
sumer arbitrations in California alone. The
firm described 99.9 percent of those arbi-
trations as “collection” cases – and more
than half involved MBNA credit cardhold-
ers. If arbitration firms are in fact acting as
debt collectors, they should be subject to
regulation by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion under the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act and other statutes.
In a formal filing with the FTC in June,
2007, two consumers’ rights organizations,
the National Consumer Law Center and
the National Association of Consumer Ad-
vocates, said this about the NAF:
“Certain debt collectors file claims with
the NAF simply as data streams rather
than fully formed complaints. NAF then
formats the data streams into documents
and sends the documents to the NAF arbi-
trators with pre-printed orders. The arbitra-
tors are not sent any original documents
establishing that the consumers actually
agreed to either the arbitration clauses or
the credit contracts, but simply receive flat
non-evidentiary assertions from the
lenders that the consumers agreed to arbi-
tration and the accounts.”7
In its own filing, NAF said, “NAF arbitra-
tors do not receive ‘pre-printed orders’
from case coordinators.”8
Yet NAF mounted an aggressive market-
ing campaign to convince businesses that
binding mandatory arbitration reduces
their costs and speeds collection efforts.
For example, in an October 1997 market-
ing letter, the National Arbitration Forum’s
Edward C. Anderson wrote, “The Supreme
Court has cleared the way and major
American companies are moving all of
their contracts to an arbitration basis as
fast as possible. There is no reason for
your clients to be exposed to the costs and
risks of the jury system.”9
What’s Wrong with BMA?
Consumers are most often locked into
binding mandatory arbitration (BMA) by
what are known in the law as “contracts of
adhesion” – pacts in which one side is so
dominant that the other party has no real
ability to bargain. 
Although some credit card contracts con-
tain an “opt-out” clause that permits con-
sumers to refuse BMA, opting out usually
requires notice in writing within a short
period of time from initiation of the con-
tract, typically 30 days. As the credit card
companies well know, while an opt-out
clause creates the appearance of a choice,
this appearance is largely a fraud. 
These clauses are legalistic and buried in
the lengthy fine print that accompanies
credit card contracts. It is highly unlikely
that most consumers read these documents
– or understand the full implications of the
contract or the arbitration clause. Never-
theless, many courts have enforced arbitra-
tion clauses because consumers did not
take the extra steps that would have al-
lowed them to opt out.10
The shift toward arbitration was enabled
by a controversial 1984 Supreme Court
decision, Southland Corp. et al. v Keating,
which proclaimed that “Congress declared
a national policy favoring arbitration”
when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) in 1925, and for the first time said
the Act was binding on state courts. With
subsequent encouragement from federal
courts and promotion by arbitration
providers, increasing numbers of busi-
nesses require employees and customers to
How the Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers
Public Citizen September 2007
6
agree that future disputes will be settled
through BMA.
One motivation for the courts’ blessing of
BMA despite the lack of procedural safe-
guards appears to be sheer self-interest: to
reduce the number of cases in federal
court. In Circuit City v. Adams, for exam-
ple, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy noted
his concern that exempting employment
contracts from BMA would “burden” fed-
eral courts.11 But, as Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote in a prominent dissent, the
Court is playing “ostrich to the substantial
history behind” the law.12 Duke University
law professor Paul D. Carrington noted
that the “Supreme Court rewrote that
statute as a service to corporations that
don’t like jury trials.”13
While the 7th Amendment of the Constitu-
tion guarantees the right to trial by jury for
civil suits at common law, the courts have
eviscerated this critical right – a right at
the heart of our Founders’ concerns about
the liberty of citizens – in dealing with
BMA. Under normal circumstances, waiv-
ing the right to trial by jury requires
waivers to be “knowing, voluntary, and in-
tentional.” But in the rush to uphold agree-
ments to arbitrate, courts use a much lower
standard. “Ignoring the special standards
used to determine whether a waiver of jury
trial is valid,” Professor Jean R. Sternlight,
an expert on arbitration, said in 2003,
“courts have typically employed an ordi-
nary contractual analysis and simply con-
sidered whether there was an agreement to
arbitrate, whether it covered the dispute in
question, and whether it was void for con-
tractual reasons such as unconscionability
or fraud.”14
The sliver of arbitration results that are
publicly available reveals that companies
that force consumers into BMA enjoy a
staggering success rate. And the system is
rife with problems that show its unfair-
ness:
• BMA proceedings are secret. Hear-
ings are not open, and lack both a tran-
script and, generally, a written
explanation of the decision. With the
exception of the California reports, in-
formation on the work of the arbitra-
tion firms is rarely made public. This
secrecy further slants the playing field
against consumers. While companies
that employ the arbitration firms enjoy
a full view of past cases that both an
arbitration firm and an individual arbi-
trator handled on its behalf, consumers
have none of this information. “The
business defendant resolving disputes
secretly knows all about any successful
claims and can guide itself accordingly
while his or her adversary negotiates in
ignorance,” one arbitration expert
wrote.15 Businesses enjoy this secrecy
because consumers, employees and
small businesses stuck in BMA have
no idea if others similarly situated
were harmed by a similar kind of cor-
porate abuse. Secrecy also means that
consumers cannot set a strong public
precedent so that the rights of others
can be vindicated more easily and effi-
ciently. 
• Arbitration providers have a strong
incentive to establish anti-consumer
rules to attract and retain clients.
Some supposedly neutral arbitration
firms go so far as to advertise their
pro-business policies to attract corpo-
rate clients. Firms that seek to level the
playing field face sharp consequences.
For example, one arbitration firm
briefly said it would permit class-wide
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arbitrations even when an arbitration
clause prohibited them. After several
companies dropped the firm as an arbi-
tration service provider, the firm
switched course and joined the other
arbitration firms in enforcing clauses
prohibiting class-wide arbitrations.16
• Individual arbitrators have financial
incentives to favor the clients of ar-
bitration companies that hire them.
Unlike judges, arbitrators are paid only
when they are assigned cases by arbi-
tration companies. Rich rewards ac-
crue to arbitrators who receive a steady
diet of cases; they can earn upwards of
$1 million a year. Meanwhile, arbitra-
tors who issue pro-consumer rulings
risk being blackballed, as one Harvard
law professor allegedly was.17
• BMA often costs consumers more
than court. Unlike court proceedings,
the costs of which are generally cov-
ered by a single filing fee, the arbitra-
tion process includes a menu of
pay-as-you-go fees. Costs can be im-
posed for issuance of a subpoena; for
filing a motion; for a written explana-
tion of an arbitrator’s rationale for
making a decision and several other
stages in the process. The fee struc-
tures are on a sliding scale – the higher
the amount sought, the higher the costs
– creating increased obstacles for those
seeking or facing significant damages.
Arbitration advocates suggest that, un-
like the cost of arbitration, the cost of
going to court includes attorney fees.
They fail to point out that participants
in arbitration are also allowed to retain
attorneys – which they should.
• The right to an appeal is limited and
not well communicated. BMA gives
consumers less information on the
right to an appeal than the court sys-
tem. And litigants’ rights are very lim-
ited because fair rules of procedure
and evidence that govern court cases
do not apply in BMA. While the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act gives losing parties
90 days to appeal an arbitration award
– and only on very narrow grounds –
arbitration providers and their clients,
like the credit card companies, gener-
ally do not advise consumers of this
deadline. Instead, the companies wait
until the 90-day appeal deadline ex-
pires before going to court to seek ju-
dicial confirmation of the award,
leaving the defendant virtually bereft
of grounds for appeal.
Even when consumers meet the appeal
deadline, satisfaction can be elusive
because federal law severely limits the
grounds for courts to vacate an award
– essentially to fraud or corruption on
the part of an arbitrator. An award can
only be overturned if a consumer can
prove that it was procured by fraud,
corruption or other undue means, the
arbitrator displayed “evident partiality
or corruption,” or the arbitrator was
guilty of misconduct.
In very rare cases, we found that con-
sumers can succeed in overturning an
award when a judge finds that the
credit card company cannot prove the
card holder agreed to arbitration.
Because of the lack of better consumer
protection laws, mere unfairness – or
even gross injustice – is not grounds to
overturn an arbitrator’s decision. Arbi-
trators can misconstrue the law, misap-
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ply the law or err in their findings of
fact. For example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled
in 2006 that the fact that an arbitrator’s
interpretation of a contract is “wacky”
is insufficient grounds for court review
of a decision.18 The Supreme Court
said in 2001 that there is no review of
an arbitrator’s decision on the merits
even if the decision is “silly.”19 In
1992, the California Supreme Court
said a decision can be upheld even if it
would cause “substantial injustice.”20
• Parties cannot easily obtain needed
information. Parties’ rights to discov-
ery, a pre-trial process that obtains in-
formation from one’s opponent, are
severely limited in arbitration. Arbitra-
tion providers actually advertise these
limited rights to prospective corporate
clients.21 Even the limited rights par-
ties enjoy are subject to the whims of
arbitrators. The result is that less infor-
mation is available to consumers.
Egregious examples of wrongdoing
might never be exposed because criti-
cal evidence never surfaces. 
• Arbitration providers do not follow
basic due process requirements.
Strong evidence shows that arbitration
providers often make their own rules,
and they decide when to follow them.
When an Alabama lawyer representing
a Citibank credit card holder wrote that
the arbitrator’s resumé suggested that
he might have done legal work for fi-
nancial institutions, the National Arbi-
tration Forum refused her request to
disclose information on NAF arbitra-
tions he had done involving Citibank
and other financial institutions – even
though that might have required his
disqualification. The lawyer also asked
– unsuccessfully – for NAF to remove
the arbitrator if NAF refused to furnish
the information.22
In a racial discrimination case involv-
ing financing of auto purchases, NAF
accepted the weeks-late filing of a doc-
ument by the defendant that had se-
lected NAF, even though the company
had not asked for an extension of the
deadline. But, when the auto buyers al-
leging racial discrimination asked for a
few extra days to respond to the late
filing, NAF turned them down, accord-
ing to their lawyer.23
• BMA clauses usually prohibit class
action lawsuits, denying a remedy.
Numerous binding mandatory arbitra-
tion contracts ban consumers from
joining class action suits or class arbi-
trations. Consumers whose complaint
may only be worth $500 or $1,000, for
example, are unlikely to find lawyers
willing to take their cases on a contin-
gency fee basis. But when they can
join with other similarly situated con-
sumers in a class action, the likelihood
of getting a lawyer to take the case on
a contingency increases. A recent deci-
sion by the Washington state Supreme
Court struck down an anti class-action
clause in a cell phone agreement be-
cause, the court found, there would be
no way for consumers to vindicate
their rights without the ability to act in
concert as part of a class action.24
• BMA clauses sometimes impose an
unfair “loser pays” rule. NAF adver-
tises to corporate clients that it has a
“loser pays” rule that allows the arbi-
trator to assess all costs, including at-
torneys’ fees, against the arbitration
loser – almost always a consumer.
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In Court
• Service of process required: Due
process requires actual notice through
an official process server to initiate a
claim.
• Neutral decision-maker: Jury of peers
or impartial, publicly employed judge
with public record of decisions.
• Open, public process that sets prece-
dent.
• Due process rights to fair and reason-
able discovery of information; hear-
ings and motions filed at little or no
cost.
• Contingency fee system, generally in
negligence cases or product liability
cases, means plaintiffs’ attorneys, not
consumer-plaintiffs, take on financial
risks for duration of case.
• Right to appeal a loss on the merits of
the case or other grounds.
Consumers Lack Rights in Binding Mandatory Arbitration:
Snapshot of BMA Versus the Courts
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In Binding Mandatory Arbitration
• Certified mail with signed receipt or by
private carrier with receipt signed by
“person of suitable age and discretion”
deemed sufficient notice for arbitration
even though many consumers remain un-
aware of cases pending against them.
• Biased decision-maker:Arbitrator cho-
sen from a limited panel and paid by an ar-
bitration provider selected and
compensated by the company; no public
record of prior decisions generally avail-
able to consumers.
• Closed, secretive process without public
record or precedential value.
• Little discovery, at discretion of arbitra-
tor. Other due process rights must be paid
for on an à la carte basis.
• Pay-to-play payment system means indi-
vidual must shell out costs up-front at
every twist and turn in case; Loser pays
rule may further financially burden con-
sumers when imposed.
• Very limited grounds for appeal, typi-
cally limited to fraud or corruption of arbi-
trator, unconscionable clause or contract,
or failure of company to prove that con-
sumer agreed to BMA.
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In 1995, as their marriage was
breaking up and he was moving out of the
house, Troy Cornock’s wife opened an
MBNA credit card account in his name,
adding herself to the account as an “au-
thorized user.” In 1999, Cornock first
learned of the account when he got a tele-
phone call from an MBNA representative
demanding money.25
Bill statements had been going to
his wife’s address, where he had lived be-
fore the separation.26
MBNA ignored Cornock’s protests
that he had not opened the account.27 It
also rebuffed his request to remove his
name from the account, saying he would
need his wife’s permission to do so and
that she would have to assume responsi-
bility for the debt.28
In 2001, MBNA filed a case against
Cornock with the National Arbitration
Forum. It sent an Airborne Express enve-
lope with notification of the arbitration
case to his wife’s address, where he had
lived before the separation. An Airborne
Express driver knew he didn’t live there
anymore and delivered the package to
him at the sawmill where he worked.29
Cornock responded with a letter that said
his ex-wife had opened the account in his
name and that he was unaware of it until
getting that 1999 call from MBNA.30
Hearing no more from NAF, he as-
sumed his explanation had been accepted.
He was wrong. NAF mailed a re-
sponse to Cornock – to the address where
he had lived with his wife, not to the ad-
dress from his Nov. 26, 2001, letter. NAF
and MBNA continued to send mail to his
former address even after he gave them
his new address.31
At one point, MBNA acknowledged
that it had learned of his new address.
The firm claimed, however, that Cornock
had not affirmatively ordered MBNA or
NAF to send mail to the new address, nor
had he told them that he would not get
mail if it were sent to the old address.32
Meanwhile, the arbitration moved
forward. The NAF arbitrator, Douglas R.
Gray, a retired Associate Justice of the
New Hampshire Superior Court, twice
asked MBNA for a copy of the credit card
application with Cornock’s signature on it
and for purchase receipts containing his
signature.33
MBNA did not supply the docu-
ments, instead responding that it was not
required to produce them because the
“account stated theory of liability” ap-
plied in this case. MBNA wrote, “the ac-
count stated theory, a common law cause
of action, merely requires a creditor to
show that a balance is due and owing by
the debtor based on an account estab-
lished between the parties and that the
debtor has failed to object to the balance
claimed after having reasonable opportu-
nity to do so.”34
The arbitrator then awarded MBNA
$9,446.85 on March 26, 2002.35
When MBNA went to court for
confirmation of the award, Cornock did
not respond because the documents were
sent to his ex-wife’s address.36 The court
found that Cornock had defaulted and
MBNA then petitioned for a default judg-
ment, which it got in May 2003.37
Later, in 2005, Cornock was served
with a summons to appear at a court hear-
ing. He hired a lawyer, who had the de-
fault judgment set aside and filed a 
Troy Cornock:
Identity Theft Claims Fall on Deaf Ears
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motion to have the arbitration award
tossed out.
MBNA fought this effort, using
some dubious arguments, again including
the “account stated doctrine of liability.”
With Cornock emphatically denying that
it was his account, the court rejected the
argument and granted summary judgment
for him.
Judge Gillian L. Abramson, of the
New Hampshire Superior Court, wrote
that in the absence of proof that Cornock
had signed the application or purchase re-
ceipts proving that he had used the ac-
count, his name on the account was
“insufficient evidence” that he had agreed
to arbitration.
“To hold otherwise,” the opinion
said, “would allow any credit card com-
pany to force victims of identity theft into
arbitration, simply because that person’s
name is on the account ... MBNA has
produced no evidence indicating that the
defendant ever agreed to the credit card
agreement, especially the arbitration pro-
visions of that agreement….” 
In the opinion, the judge cited ap-
provingly a 2006 Kansas Supreme Court
opinion in MBNA Bank America NA v.
Loretta K. Credit that upheld a card
holder’s claim that she was not subject to
arbitration. That opinion said the facts in
that case and an earlier Kansas case “ap-
pear to reflect a national trend in which
consumers are questioning MBNA and
whether arbitration agreements exist ...
Given MBNA’s casual approach to this
litigation, we are not surprised that the
trend may be growing.”38
Cornock is now pursuing MBNA in
court as he struggles to rebuild a credit
rating wrecked by the company’s pursuit
of him. He managed to get a Capital One
credit card with a $200 limit – and he had
to pay Capital One $100 when he got the
card, he said in an interview.39 He paid
off the balance every month and eventu-
ally was accorded a higher limit.
When he wanted to own a home, he
was unable to get a home mortgage. So,
he cashed out his pre-tax retirement sav-
ings, paid income taxes on the funds, and
bought a lot and a partially completed
modular home.
Using the equity in the house, he
was able to get a loan to finance its com-
pletion.
Still, his record has not been
cleared.
“I went to a mortgage specialist the
other day,” Cornock told Public Citizen.
“He said the only bad mark I have is the
Bank of America [MBNA] – that I am
still liable for $10,800 or something.”40
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Arbitration companies do not voluntar-ily disclose records of decisions by
arbitrators that would show how often they
rule for consumers. Occasionally, individ-
ual plaintiffs are able to liberate informa-
tion through litigation. 
But as for general data, sources are scarce.
California is the only state in the country
that requires arbitration providers to pub-
licly disclose any information at all, and
the disclosures cover only cases that occur
in California. Outside of California, there
is no information that would allow con-
sumers to even begin to assess whether an
arbitrator is biased. 
Even the California data are difficult to un-
derstand – information is posted by NAF
in a manner that makes it difficult to put
the picture together, i.e., by posting each
case on a separate page. So even the few
Californian consumers who are aware the
data exist would find it extremely chal-
lenging to figure out whether a particular
arbitrator is fair.
When we imported these data into a
searchable database, the resulting picture
was not pretty.
Available evidence indicates that the cor-
porate clients of arbitration companies
enjoy a truly staggering success rate – be-
tween 94 percent and 99 percent – and that
individual arbitrators sometimes dispose of
dozens of cases in a single day, ruling 100
percent for corporate claimants. Such a
record reinforces the impression that arbi-
trators are essentially rubber-stamping cor-
porate claims.
Data from Alabama Case Show
Overwhelming Anti-Consumer Record
of NAF
Consider the overwhelming success that
First USA Bank, once a major credit card
issuer, enjoyed due to the work of NAF ar-
bitrators between early 1998 (when the
bank began to force its credit card cus-
tomers to use arbitration) and early 2000.
First USA Bank was forced to turn over
statistics on its arbitration cases to a plain-
tiff who sued the firm in an Alabama court,
allowing the information to become pub-
lic.41
The bottom line from these data was clear.
In the nearly 20,000 cases where NAF
reached a decision, First USA prevailed in
an astonishing 99.6 percent of cases.
Chapter I
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“You would have to be unconscious not to be
aware that if you rule a certain way, you can
compromise your future business.”
Richard Hodge,
Judge-Turned-Arbitrator
Those cases represented less than half of
the more than 50,000 claims First USA
filed against its cardholders. Others were
either pending or had fallen by the way-
side, usually because documents were not
served on the cardholder within a 90-day
window.
In the infinitesimal number of cases in
which the cardholder filed a claim against
First USA, the outcomes were better.
Cardholders filed four claims and won two
of them. Another case was settled and the
fourth was pending when the statistics
were submitted in early 2000.42 
In a different case in federal court in Dal-
las, First USA filed papers that showed it
paid NAF $5.3 million between January
1998 and November 1999.43
Citing the fact that First USA filed more
than 50,000 cases against customers while
customers filed only four cases against the
firm, a study published by the University
of Chicago Law Review in 2006 said,
“Every indication is that the imposed arbi-
tration clauses are nothing but a shield
against legal accountability by the credit
card companies.”44
Use of NAF Yields Poor Results for
Consumers
While the National Arbitration Forum and
other arbitration providers are highly se-
cretive, the California law does offer a re-
vealing look at the results of arbitration for
ordinary consumers. 
In reaction to arbitration firms’ reluctance
to disclose their arbitrators’ records, Cali-
fornia’s legislature passed a law requiring
the firms, beginning in January 2003, to
make public quarterly reports on arbitra-
tion cases in that state that involved con-
sumers.
NAF resisted disclosure, arguing it was
not required to publish the information be-
cause the California statute was preempted
by federal law, regulations and policy. In
2004, the state assembly woman who
wrote the law, Ellen Corbett, and Con-
sumer Action, a San Francisco non-profit,
sued NAF.45After a judge dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue, the San Francisco
District attorney opened an investigation.46
NAF responded by suing the prosecutor in
federal court but subsequently dropped the
suit and began publishing the reports on its
Web site.47
The NAF California reports run to thou-
sands of pages – each page provides only a
slim account of a single arbitration case.
NAF’s public Web site contains 17 reports,
covering Jan. 1, 2003, through March 31,
2007. The 17 reports show that MBNA
card holders were involved in 53 percent
of the nearly 34,000 cases NAF handled in
California. (Nationwide, NAF said in 2005
that it handles more than 50,000 cases an-
nually.)48
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Outcomes of Arbitration Cases
Filed by First USA Bank
No. of 
Outcome Instances Pct.
Card member
prevailed 87 0.4
First USA 
prevailed 19,618 99.6
Total 19,705 100
Source: Michael A. Bownes v. First USA Bank NA, et
al Circuit Court of Montgomery, Ala., Civil Action No.
99-2479-PR.
Public Citizen did an extensive computer-
assisted analysis of the reports that de-
tailed the one-sided nature of arbitration. It
showed that NAF’s arbitration business in
California is devoted almost exclusively to
debt collection. Indeed, all but 15 of the
33,948 cases are labeled “collection”
cases.
Consumers filed only 118 cases against
corporations – 0.35 percent of all cases –
and all but 13 of the consumer-filed cases
were labeled “collection.” 
Of the consumer-filed cases, consumers
prevailed in less than half – 30. NAF said
businesses prevailed in 61 cases. (It la-
beled the prevailing party in the remaining
cases “N/A.”)
The data also indicate that many of the ar-
bitrations – 14,654 of them – were not
completed. There is no indication that an
arbitrator was assigned to any of these
cases, most of which were settled or dis-
missed without an award to the claimant.
The remaining 19,294 cases involved an
arbitrator. In all, 148 arbitrators were
named in the NAF reports. Public Citi-
zen’s analysis shows that a small cadre of
arbitrators handled most of the cases that
went to a decision. In total, 28 arbitrators
handled 17,265 cases – accounting for a
whopping 89.5 percent of cases in which
an arbitrator was appointed – and ruled for
the company nearly 95 percent of the time.
Another 120 arbitrators handled slightly
more than 10 percent of the cases in which
an arbitrator was assigned. They ruled for
businesses 86 percent of the time and for
consumers 10 percent.
Topping the list of the busiest arbitrators
was Joseph Nardulli, who handled 1,332
arbitrations and ruled for the corporate
claimant an overwhelming 97 percent of
the time.
Nardulli is an Irvine, Calif., attorney. His
firm’s Web site says, “The Nardulli Law
Firm represents business and corporate
clients….” Among other things, the prac-
tices corporate and business litigation in
the area of arbitration, according to its
Web site.49 It also notes that Nardulli is an
NAF arbitrator.
The table on the next page provides details
about the 28 NAF arbitrators in California
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Summary of NAF’s Calif. Cases:
Jan. 1, 2003-March 31, 2007
Total MBNA Pct.
Cases Cases of Totals
33,948 18,101 53.3
Source: Public Citizen analysis of NAF reports.
NAF California Cases with an Arbitrator: Outcomes
Business Consumer N/A
Disposition Total Wins Wins Wins
Hearing/default
– Document hearing 16,056 16,054 (99.9%) 2 (0.01%)
Hearing 2,019 1,991 (98.6%) 28 (1.4%)
Dismissed 772 21(2.7%) 751 (97.3%)
Award by Settlement 25 25 (100%) 0 (0.0%)
Settled 422 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 422 (100%)
Totals 19,294 18,091 (93.8%) 781 (4.0%) 422 (2.2%)
Source: Public Citizen analysis of NAF reports.
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between Jan. 1, 2003, and March 31, 2007,
who handled more than 100 cases. Of
these top 28, who decided nearly 90 per-
cent of the cases, all had decision records
for corporate interests of between 72.2
percent and 98.8 percent – with 25 having
a record of 92.4 percent or higher. Their
decision rates in favor of consumers
ranged from 0.6 percent to 24.7 percent,
with only four deciding for the consumer
more than 5 percent of the time.
NAF reports show that the firm’s arbitra-
tors frequently crank out arbitrations en
masse, handling dozens in a single day. Al-
though NAF refers to these as “document
hearings,” no hearing is held. Instead, the
arbitrator makes a decision based on docu-
ments submitted by the parties. 
Joseph Nardulli, NAF’s busiest arbitrator
in California, does bulk arbitration. Nar-
dulli’s busiest day was Jan. 12, 2007,
when he signed 68 arbitration decisions,
awarding debt holders and debt buyers
every penny – nearly $1 million – that
they demanded. The same was true for his
second-busiest day as well. 
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Pct. Pct.
Amount Amount Business Consumer
Arbitrator Cases Claimed Awarded Wins Wins
Joseph Nardulli 1,332 $15,602,571 $15,039,941 97.0 1.6
James Knotter 1,011 10,635,086 9,509,667 95.4 2.9
Victor Waid 907 9,489,479 9,265,932 97.6 1.4
Steven Schneider 901 9,938,495 9,541,172 96.2 1.4
Sally Williams 899 9,463,649 9,270,870 98.6 1.0
Kendall Reed 877 10,744,175 9,784,554 93.5 3.5
Ronald Kahn 820 9,412,461 9,016,225 96.6 1.7
Joe Henderson 779 9,862,132 9,527,014 96.7 1.4
Venetta Tassopulos 743 9,566,630 9,142,714 96.8 2.0
Sheldon Michaels 699 8,598,671 8,298,062 97.0 1.3
Anita Shapiro 677 7,466,825 6,902,056 96.0 2.1
Bradley Webb 652 7,505,113 6,160,438 95.0 2.3
David Makous 644 7,388,932 6,093,079 94.7 2.6
Stephen Biersmith 625 8,371,955 8,037,046 96.0 1.3
Adrienne Jennings 597 5,091,323 4,297,733 86.3 13.4
Stephen Blumberg 592 8,106,670 7,463,211 93.4 1.9
Jonathan Krotinger 571 7,444,639 5,159,380 72.2 24.7
Robert McMillan 543 6,893,642 6,365,780 92.8 5.3
Steven Bromberg 524 6,427,419 6,193,407 96.2 1.7
Urs Martin Lauchli 504 6,357,672 6,066,713 95.0 2.4
Coralie Kupfer 497 4,977,467 4,656,175 98.2 1.0
Carol Medof 357 4,967,123 4,144,123 92.4 3.9
Patrick Huang 354 3,536,357 2,982,041 87.0 9.0
Jeffery Carlson 334 3,384,014 3,221,544 96.7 2.4
Jeff Ferentz 298 2,997,799 2,902,769 97.9 1.0
Richard Wharton 224 2,559,506 2,368,474 96.0 1.3
C. Ferguson 166 2,278,270 2,140,078 94.6 0.6
Lawrence Crispo 138 2,060,923 1,929,144 95.7 2.9
Total 17,265 200,736,495 185,479,341 94.7 3.3
Source: Public Citizen analysis of NAF reports.
Records of NAF Arbitrators in California with More Than 100 Cases
Nardulli’s prolific record startled one for-
mer NAF arbitrator when she was told
about it. “I never would have done it at a
pace where I would have done 68 in one
day,” said Elizabeth Bartholet, a former
NAF arbitrator. Bartholet, a Harvard law
professor, was removed from about a
dozen credit card cases by NAF after she
found against a credit card company and
awarded its cardholder $48,000.50 Bartho-
let said she generally spent about an hour
on uncomplicated cases decided on the
basis of documents. (See Chapter Two for
an account of Bartholet’s negative experi-
ence with the National Arbitration Forum.)
Public Citizen examined Nardulli’s six
busiest days: four in 2006 and two in
2007. On those days, he signed 332 arbi-
tration decisions, awarding the debt hold-
ers nearly the full amount that they
demanded – more than $3.4 million. The
table above details those six busiest days. 
Close Ties: MBNA Claims Were Over Half
of NAF’s California Cases
MBNA’s NAF arbitration cases, including
those filed by debt buyers who purchased
MBNA accounts, totaled 18,101 and repre-
sented 53.3 percent of the NAF California
cases. NAF reports included the name of
an arbitrator in 10,573 MBNA cases –
more than half of the 19,294 NAF cases
with an arbitrator’s name attached. Most
of the cases with arbitrators’ names at-
tached were decided in favor of the com-
pany that filed the complaint. Some were
decided for the consumer and a few were
dismissed.
In cases in which there was a recorded de-
cision and an arbitrator was listed, MBNA
won awards in 96 percent of the cases –
totaling $145.8 million in awards.
Eighty-four percent of the MBNA cases
were decided by a small cadre of 27 NAF
arbitrators. Another 116 arbitrators han-
dled the remaining 16 percent, including
68 arbitrators who handled fewer than 10
cases.
The small group of MBNA’s 27 very busy
arbitrators ruled for the company 94 per-
cent of the time and for consumers 2.8 per-
cent. (The prevailing party was listed as
“N/A” in the remaining cases.). The 116
arbitrators who decided fewer than 100
MBNA cases ruled for MBNA 87.9 per-
cent of the time and for consumers 8 per-
cent.
The chart on the next page shows the work
of the busiest arbitrators in MBNA cases –
those who handled 100 or more of the ar-
How the Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers
Public Citizen
No. of Business Consumer Amount Amount
Cases Date Wins Wins Claimed Awarded
68 1/12/2007 68 0 $919,306 $919,306 
58 6/2/2006 58 0 $616,665 $616,665
55 10/5/2006 55 0 $801,032 $800,632
52 2/28/2007 52 0 $276,784 $276,664
51 11/30/2006 51 0 $573,243 $573,173
46 11/22/2006 46 0 $657,690 $657,470
332 332 0 $3,432,919 $3,432,259
Source: Public Citizen analysis of NAF reports.
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bitrations. Again, Joseph Nardulli, the
Irvine, Calif., business attorney, led the
pack.
What NAF Tells Its Clients and 
Prospective Clients
The Forum frequently boasts about how it
can help corporations skirt the court sys-
tem and provides a guide on its Web site
for drafting arbitration clauses.51 The
opening sentence of the 20-page guide
suggests that consumers favor arbitration,
saying, “Due to the high costs and time de-
lays of lawsuits, businesses and individu-
als are turning to dispute resolution in
record numbers.” It offers “practical tips
and simple language” on writing arbitra-
tion clauses to withstand court challenges
and includes 15 pages of sample clauses.
Over the years, NAF has relentlessly
touted the benefits of arbitration:
• “By including a pre-dispute mediation
and arbitration clause in contracts, par-
ties can be assured that future disputes
will be routed into efficient, fair, effec-
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% %
MBNA MBNA MBNA Consumer Consumer
Arbitrator Cases Wins Wins Wins Wins
Joseph Nardulli 772 737 95.5 16 2.1
Joe Henderson 511 490 95.9 7 1.4
Venetta Tassopulos 468 448 95.7 12 2.6
Steven Schneider 464 439 94.6 7 1.5
Kendall Reed 460 424 92.2 13 2.8
Sally Williams 450 444 98.7 3 0.7
James Knotter 448 426 95.1 8 1.8
Stephen Blumberg 445 412 92.6 8 1.8
Ronald Kahn 422 408 96.7 4 0.9
Stephen Biersmith 406 387 95.3 6 1.5
Victor Waid 363 354 97.5 4 1.1
Sheldon Michaels 342 327 95.6 5 1.5
Anita Shapiro 334 313 93.7 9 2.7
Urs Martin Lauchli 328 307 93.6 8 2.4
Bradley Webb 294 272 92.5 10 3.4
Jonathan Krotinger 293 250 85.3 32 10.9
David Makous 283 260 91.9 10 3.5
Steven Bromberg 278 267 96.0 4 1.4
Carol Medof 233 212 91.0 9 3.9
Robert McMillan 231 205 88.7 17 7.4
Patrick Huang 181 150 82.9 17 9.4
Jeffery Carlson 161 153 95.0 5 3.1
Coralie Kupfer 158 152 96.2 3 1.9
Richard Wharton 146 137 93.8 3 2.0
Adrienne Jennings 139 112 80.6 26 18.7
C. Ferguson 132 125 94.7 1 0.8
Lawrence Crispo 105 102 97.1 1 1.0
Total 8,847 8313 94.0 248 2.8
Source: Public Citizen analysis of NAF reports.
Records of NAF Arbitrators with More Than 100 MBNA Cases
tive forums – mediation and arbitration
– rather than the lawsuit system,” the
on-line guide says.52
• Anderson, NAF’s managing director,
raved about the benefits NAF offers
corporations. In a 2001 interview with
The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel,
Anderson said, “Corporate counsel
should take advantage of arbitration to
minimize their companies’ exposure to
abusive lawsuits. Current develop-
ments in the law have made arbitration
an even more effective tool for these
purposes.”53
Anderson’s other comments emphasized
that discovery is limited by the arbitrator.
In a 2002 deposition, he admitted that the
NAF discovery rules may be more restric-
tive than discovery law in the state where
arbitration is being conducted.54And, he
said, NAF has a “loser pays” rule that al-
lows the arbitrator to assess all costs, in-
cluding attorney costs, against the
arbitration loser. 
Public Efforts by NAF to Defend 
Arbitration
The NAF pitch to the public is much dif-
ferent. It strains to pass its services off as a
less costly and more expeditious substitute
for the courts that, at the same time, offers
protections afforded by the courts. 
“We are impartial, and more importantly
our arbitrators – former judges, lawyers
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“Limited Discovery – Very little, if any,
discovery and pre-hearing maneuver-
ing.”59
“The Alternative to the Million dollar
lawsuit .... reasonable costs .... rational
results ... real reform.”60
“There is no reason for Saxon Mortgage
Inc. to be exposed to the costs and risks
of the jury system.”61
“Awards limited – Awards may not ex-
ceed claim for which fee paid.”62
“Loser pays. Prevailing party may be
awarded costs.”63
“Arbitration can save up to 66 percent of
your collection costs.”64
“As in court, the parties may request rel-
evant documents and information from
the other party (known as discovery),
and parties are entitled to the same range
of legal remedies and awards that are
available to them in court.”56
“A 2003 American Bar Association
study of employment arbitration found
that claimants prevailed more often and
received larger awards in arbitration
than in litigation.”57
“In no event will you be required to re-
imburse us for any arbitration filing, ad-
ministrative or hearing fees in an
amount greater than what your court
costs would have been if the Claim had
been resolved in a state court with juris-
diction.”58
What NAF Tells 
The Public 
COMPARE and CONTRAST
What NAF Tells
Prospective Clients
and law professors – are impartial,” An-
derson told The Washington Post in 2000,
at a time when NAF’s work was being
challenged in a number of lawsuits.55
Five years later, apparently desperate to
convince the public of the fairness of arbi-
tration, NAF publicized a 2004 study fi-
nanced by the American Bankers
Association and conducted by Ernst &
Young. The study touted the alleged fair-
ness of arbitration. The study’s results, in-
dicating that consumers often succeed in
arbitration, contrast sharply with NAF’s
reports to the state of California and the
statistics provided by First USA Bank,
which show that consumers succeed less
than 5 percent of the time.
In a February 2005 press release, NAF
drew sweeping conclusions about the
study: “Based on consumer arbitration
data spanning four years from the National
Arbitration Forum, this independent study
conducted by Ernst & Young confirms that
consumers win 55 percent of the time in
arbitrations against businesses, and that
consumers find the arbitration process
beneficial for resolving legal claims.”65
But the press release omitted some crucial
details buried in the report.
Ernst & Young examined only 226 “lend-
ing-related” cases. All of the 226 cases
were initiated by consumers, not compa-
nies. These were the only “consumer lend-
ing” cases that debtors filed with NAF
between January 2000 and January 2004 –
during a time when NAF routinely han-
dled “tens of thousands” of arbitrations an-
nually, according to testimony in 2002 by
Anderson.66
The study claims that consumers prevailed
79 percent of the time in the 226 cases ex-
amined. But the authors assumed that a
consumer “won” if the case was dismissed
at the consumer’s request (or by agree-
ment). Yet, there are many reasons why a
consumer might end a case; for example,
the arbitration might be too costly to pur-
sue, as the study found in at least one case.
And the report’s assertion that 69 percent
of consumers were satisfied with arbitra-
tion was based on telephone interviews
with just 29 of the 226 claimants – less
than 13 percent – hardly a sample signifi-
cant enough to support its sweeping claim.
The study’s other major conclusion – that
consumers prevailed in 55 percent of the
subset of 97 cases that involved a hearing
– is also flawed. Because the authors ac-
knowledged that assuming consumer satis-
faction based merely on a dismissal is a
biased measure, they included this second
metric. The vast majority of credit card ar-
bitrations, however, are not decided by
hearings, but rather on the basis of docu-
ments submitted by the company.
According to the Ernst & Young study,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP, a major Washington, D.C., law firm
now known as WilmerHale, hired the firm
to do the ABA-financed study.67 This is the
same law firm that allegedly co-sponsored
a 1999 meeting of credit card companies
that, according to a federal lawsuit, was a
prelude to formation of an alleged coali-
tion of credit card companies in an effort
to impose arbitration requirements on cus-
tomers.68
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NAF was founded in 1986 as a sub-
sidiary of another company, Equilaw Inc.,
which subsequently went bankrupt. NAF,
headed by a former Equilaw official, sur-
vived the bankruptcy and appears to have
grown rapidly in recent years.
In 1992, the National Association of
Credit Management (NACM) began to
promote the use of Equilaw’s arbitration
services to its members – 40,000 corpo-
rate credit managers.69 “All that is needed
to use the NACM/Equilaw Alternative
Dispute Resolution forum is an arbitra-
tion clause in an agreement or transac-
tion,” Bill Idzorek, Equilaw’s vice
president and marketing director, wrote in
Business Credit.70
While NAF has a small administra-
tive staff, the firm relies on a nationwide
roster of more than 1,600 part-time arbi-
trators who are paid by the case.71 That
roster appears to be expanding rapidly. In
2001, NAF Managing Director Edward
C. Anderson, testified that the firm had
about 550 arbitrators in the U.S. on its
roster.72 Sixteen months later, he said
NAF had “just short of a thousand” arbi-
trators in the U.S., mostly former
judges.73 The firm’s Web site now says it
has more than 1,600 U.S. arbitrators.74
Anderson testified in 2002 that
NAF has about a dozen owners, all
lawyers; two executives and 33 employ-
ees. He said he owned about 30 percent
of the stock.75
NAF also had close ties with ITT
Consumer Financial, a large consumer
lending firm that agreed to pay tens of
millions of dollars to settle complaints of
fraudulent lending practices. In fact,
around the time of NAF’s founding, An-
derson was a senior attorney for ITT. He
has testified that ITT Consumer Financial
chose Equilaw to handle arbitrations with
its borrowers.76
In 2000, the head of the National
Association of Consumer Advocates drew
a link between ITT and NAF. Patricia
Sturdevant, the NACA executive director
and general counsel, testified on Capitol
Hill that NAF “was established as a
mechanism for resolving ITT Consumer
Financial Services’ claims against its con-
sumer borrowers across the country by
default judgments in Minnesota.”77 In-
deed, according to a 1993 court decision,
a clause in borrowers’ agreements with
ITT Consumer Financial in California
said conflicts would be “resolved by
binding arbitration by the National Arbi-
tration Forum, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota.”78
Anderson has testified that he
worked for ITT Consumer Financial from
1985 or 1986 until early 1991.79 In 1994,
he testified that he was “assistant general
counsel” throughout his tenure there.80 In
2002, he said he was “litigation
counsel.”81
In 1989, The American Lawyer re-
ported that Anderson helped to defend
ITT Consumer Financial in what was de-
scribed as one of the biggest consumer
fraud cases in California history.82 The
state attorney general and a local prosecu-
tor accused ITT Consumer Financial of
fraudulently inducing tens of thousands
of borrowers to pay for insurance and
other extras in violation of California law.
Without admitting wrongdoing, the firm
agreed to pay $19 million in civil penal-
ties and to reimburse borrowers. Officials
estimated that the settlement could cost
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the company as much as $50 million or
more.83
A state lawsuit – filed simultane-
ously with the settlement – said ITT Con-
sumer Financial had previously been
penalized in other states. “Numerous law-
suits or other law enforcement actions
were brought by governmental agencies
in other states alleging similar practices,”
the lawsuit said, citing settlements in
Wisconsin, Iowa, Colorado, Oklahoma,
Minnesota, Arizona and Alabama.84
NAF is located in Minneapolis,
which was also the home of ITT Con-
sumer Financial and Equilaw.
Anderson also worked for Equilaw,
according to a 1994 document filed as
part of Equilaw’s bankruptcy case. It lists
Anderson as an Equilaw officer and di-
rector and the owner of a large bloc of the
firm’s stock.85
Subsequently, Anderson has seem-
ingly tried to play down his role with
Equilaw. Asked in a 2001 deposition
about his “relationship” with Equilaw, he
responded, “I was engaged to help the
owners of Equilaw raise money in 1993
or 19 – I don’t recall the exact date.”86
Asked about the percentage of own-
ership he held in Equilaw, Anderson
replied, “I don’t think I did.”87 He then
was asked, “You didn’t acquire any stock
in Equilaw?” He responded, “I really
don’t recall.” In a 2002 deposition, he did
not mention Equilaw when questioned
about his employment history.88
He has also given different versions
of the ITT Consumer Financial relation-
ship with the National Arbitration Forum.
In 1994, he testified that he first became
aware of NAF in the mid 1980s when
“our office….the general counsel’s office
of Consumer Financial Corporation” was
looking for an arbitration provider.89 He
described NAF as a “wholly owned sub-
sidiary” of Equilaw.
Seven years later, Anderson seemed
to distance himself from the ITT-Equilaw
relationship. 
“My understanding was that the
National Arbitration Forum provided ar-
bitration and was owned by Equilaw,” he
testified in a deposition.90 He also denied
that Equilaw had a relationship with ITT
in the same deposition.91
NAF boasts that many of its arbitra-
tors are former judges. Indeed, its Web
site’s main page includes a frame where
pictures of retired-judges-turned-arbitra-
tors appear, one at a time, in a rolling dis-
play.92 
In at least one case, however, the
revolving door has swung the other way,
sending one of NAF’s busiest California
arbitrators, Steven Bromberg, to the
bench. Public Citizen decided to study
Bromberg’s work after reviewing a Cali-
fornia court case in which National Credit
Acceptance Inc. tried to collect a debt
from the wrong person, Anastasiya Ko-
marova. That occurred after Bromberg is-
sued an arbitration award against another
person with a nearly identical name who
was an authorized user of an MBNA ac-
count that National Credit, a debt buyer,
had purchased.
With Arbitrator Steven Bromberg:
MBNA Won 96 Percent of the Time
MBNA certainly got results that fa-
vored its interests from Steven Bromberg,
a local mayor and busy arbitrator until his
ascension to the California bench. 
A search of the NAF California re-
ports turned up 521 consumer finance
cases that Bromberg decided between
July 2, 2003, and June 10, 2005. Busi-
nesses were successful in 504 of the cases
versus only 9 for consumers – a win rate
for consumers of only 1.7 percent. (The
remaining 8 cases were settled or other-
wise were not resolved in favor of either
side.)
Bromberg did “bulk” arbitrating,
sometimes handling dozens of cases in a
single day. He handled a total of 77 cases
in just two days, ruling against consumers
in every case, and awarding nearly a mil-
lion dollars ($947,975.35) to NAF’s cor-
porate clients:
• On Oct. 1, 2003, Bromberg signed 40
arbitration rulings in cases involving
businesses and consumers. Each rul-
ing favored the business. Awards to-
taled $428,200.83. MBNA or Bank
One Delaware were the claimants in
39 of the 40 cases. [For details, see
Appendix B.]
• On May 16, 2005, Bromberg signed
37 awards – totaling $519,774.52 – in
cases involving businesses and con-
sumers. Every ruling favored the
business. All 37 cases involved
MBNA credit card customers. [For
details, see Appendix B.]
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Looking Closely: A Case Study of an Arbitrator-Turned-Judge
Cases Handled By Arbitrator Steven Bromberg, July 2003 - June 2005
Pct Pct
Business Consumer Business Consumer
Cases Wins Wins Other Wins Wins Total
521 504 9 8 96.7% 1.7% $6,193,407
MBNA Cases Handled By Arbitrator Steven Bromberg, July 2003 - June 2005
Pct Pct
Business Consumer Business Consumer
Cases Wins Wins Other Wins Wins Total
276 267 4 5 96.7% 1.4% $4,234,419
Source: Public Citizen analysis of NAF reports.
None of these arbitration cases in-
volved a hearing. Instead, each decision
was made on the basis of documents sub-
mitted by the company seeking an award
against the consumer.
Former NAF Arbitrator in MBNA
Cases Now a Judge Handling MBNA
Cases 
NAF reports show that Bromberg
handled 521 arbitration cases for NAF
between July 2, 2003, and June 10, 2005
– an average of nearly 24 cases a month.
After that, NAF reports name him as arbi-
trator for three cases that were settled:
one on Nov. 1, 2005, in which Chase
Manhattan sought $865.25 but was
awarded nothing, one on March 6, 2006,
in which MBNA asked for $10,900.19,
but was awarded nothing, and one on
Nov. 29, 2006, where MBNA sought
$17,672.79 and received no award.93
Bromberg suddenly stopped doing
arbitration when he became a judge on a
court that rules on the requests by MBNA
and other credit card companies to con-
firm arbitration awards. On May 19,
2005, California Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger announced he had ap-
pointed Bromberg, then mayor of New-
port Beach, Calif., to a seat on the
California Superior Court in Orange
County, a post that now pays $171,648.94
Between his appointment to the bench
and his swearing-in, Bromberg continued
to make arbitration awards to credit card
companies, handling about two dozen
cases for NAF. And NAF reports include
his name on three cases that were con-
cluded after Bromberg ascended to the
bench – all “settled” cases where the
lender was awarded no money.
In his announcement, Schwarzeneg-
ger noted that Bromberg focused his legal
practice on “civil litigation with an em-
phasis on employment law” and also was
an arbitrator for Judicate West, an arbitra-
tion firm.95 Schwarzenegger’s announce-
ment did not mention Bromberg’s work
for NAF.
Judicate West, an arbitration firm,
published disclosures for California that
show Bromberg handled 48 cases for
them between mid-1999 and June 21,
2005, most of them consumer claims
against insurance companies.96
Since ascending to the bench,
Bromberg has confirmed at least four ar-
bitration awards that NAF arbitrators
made in favor of MBNA.97
At least one attorney raised this as
an issue as he appealed Bromberg’s con-
firmation of an NAF award against his
client and in favor of MBNA. In January
2005, MBNA went to Orange County Su-
perior Court, seeking confirmation of an
NAF arbitrator’s decision. Arbitrator
Thomas Hogan had found that Kent
Swahn, a Huntington Beach auto repair
shop owner, owed MBNA $14,886.76.98
Six months after MBNA filed its
suit, Bromberg became a judge and soon
thereafter, the Swahn case came before
him.99 Swahn argued that the arbitrator’s
award should be overturned. Bromberg
affirmed the award.100 Later, Joseph Rib-
akoff, Swahn’s attorney, learned that
Bromberg had been an NAF arbitrator
handling MBNA cases.101
Ribakoff appealed Bromberg’s con-
firmation of the NAF arbitration award
on several grounds. Among other things,
the appeal asserted that MBNA had not
proved that Swahn ever agreed to arbi-
trate.102At a hearing before a three-judge
appellate panel, Ribakoff raised the issue
of whether Bromberg’s work as an NAF
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arbitrator in MBNA cases constituted a
conflict of interest.103
On Aug. 11, 2006, the panel ruled
in Swahn’s favor, finding that MBNA
“failed to establish the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate with admissible
evidence.” The judges ordered
Bromberg’s affirmation of the arbitration
award overturned.
In a footnote, the judges wrote,
“This court need not reach appellant’s
other issues, including his contention,
first made at oral argument, that Judge
Bromberg had a conflict of interest due to
his prior work as an arbitrator for NAF in
matters concerning [MBNA].”104
Interestingly, the California Code of
Judicial Ethics prohibits appellate justices
from presiding in arbitration confirmation
cases within two years of having been an
arbitrator but the provision apparently
does not apply to trial court judges.105.
Months before the appellate ruling,
in January 2006, Ribakoff had filed suit
against MBNA on behalf of Swahn. The
complaint said, “Until recently, Judge
Bromberg had been an NAF arbitrator
and, in that capacity, adjudicated many
MBNA consumer debt credit card cases.
Neither MBNA nor Judge Bromberg dis-
closed these facts to Mr. Swahn. Never
disclosing his bias, Judge Bromberg
granted MBNA’s petition, even though
the court lacked jurisdiction and the arbi-
trator lack [sic] jurisdiction.”106
Ribakoff is seeking damages
against MBNA for violations of two Cali-
fornia laws and for abuse of process. He
is also seeking an order “vacating all
judgments in the state of California in
favor of MBNA based on NAF consumer
arbitration awards, and an injunction bar-
ring MBNA from seeking to enforce any
NAF judgments in favor of MBNA.” A
jury trial is scheduled for Dec. 10,
2007.107
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Hers was a classic case of “mis-
taken identity.” A single letter – “y” – led
to years of harassment of the wrong
woman.
In November 2004, National Credit
paid 9 cents on the dollar for a portfolio
of $10 million to $15 million in debts
owed to MBNA, according to documents
filed in Anastasiya Komarova’s suit
against MBNA and National Credit.
Among the debtors National Credit pur-
sued were Christopher Propper and Anas-
tasia Komarova of Long Beach, Calif.108
In February 2005, Anastasiya Ko-
marova, a San Francisco art student, got
the first of a series of phone calls about a
delinquent MBNA account. The callers
brushed off her protests that she had no
MBNA account, telling her they were
certain it was her account. According to
Komarova’s suit, a receptionist at her job
took the first call and was told that Ko-
marova had a joint account with Christo-
pher Propper. Komarova immediately
called back to say that she had never
heard of Propper and she had never had
an MBNA account. This was the first of
numerous times that her protests were
dismissed out-of-hand. She continued to
get harassing phone calls at the rate of
one or two a month. It was not until July
2005 that one of the callers told her hus-
band that National Credit Acceptance Inc.
was the organization that was trying to
collect the debt.
Meanwhile, in June 2005, NAF ar-
bitrator Steven Bromberg issued an
award of $11,214.33 in favor of National
Credit and against Christopher S. Propper
and Anastasia Komarova of Long Beach.
A month later, Komarova, the San Fran-
cisco art student, was still trying to con-
vince National Credit that it was targeting
the wrong person. She called MBNA and
learned that no one with her Social Secu-
rity number had ever had an MBNA ac-
count. 
In July 2005, National Credit wrote
to the San Francisco art student at her
home sending her a verification of debt
for $7,872.98. That letter included Prop-
per’s credit card account number. In Feb-
ruary 2006, after being served court
papers that sought confirmation of the ar-
bitration award against the Long Beach
couple, Komarova again called MBNA
and gave the representative Propper’s ac-
count number. An MBNA representative
“indicated that a person named Ko-
marova appeared as an authorized user on
Christopher Propper’s account, but that
Komarova was not responsible for the
debt since she was not the primary ac-
count holder,” according to Komarova’s
court suit. The person on Propper’s ac-
count was Anastasia Komarova – first
name without the “y.” Subsequently,
MBNA sent the art student a letter that
said Anastasia Komarova was not respon-
sible for the debt.
Komarova’s problems were not
over. In February 2006, a man delivered
to the art student’s door court papers in
which National Credit sought to confirm
Bromberg’s arbitration award against
Propper and Anastasia Komarova.
After trying unsuccessfully to get
the lawsuit dropped, Anastasiya Ko-
marova filed her own action against
MBNA America Bank NA, National
Credit Acceptance and FIA Card Services
NA, the new name for MBNA. 
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MBNA admits in court papers that
Komarova was wrongly targeted but
blames National Credit Acceptance for
going after her. And the firm alleges that
National Credit Acceptance “continued to
attempt to collect the debt…..after know-
ing that she was not the right person.”
Komarova is seeking an injunction
against MBNA and National Credit Ac-
ceptance prohibiting further debt-collec-
tion efforts against her, compensatory and
punitive damages, interest and attorney
fees. 
I. Arbitration Proceedings Are Secret
Much of what NAF and other arbitration
companies do is secret. NAF’s rules de-
cree, “arbitration proceedings are confi-
dential unless all parties agree or the law
requires arbitration information to be
made public.”109
The American Arbitration Association
(AAA) and Judicial Arbitration and Medi-
ation Services Inc. (JAMS), two other
major arbitration firms, have similar
rules.110
Most cases are decided based on docu-
ments that the arbitration company sends
to the arbitrator. When full-scale hearings
are held, they are behind close doors.
Transcripts of the hearings are not allowed
except under limited circumstances. NAF,
for example, prohibits them unless all par-
ties agree. American Arbitration Associa-
tion rules say, “generally, there will be no
stenographic record.”111 JAMS allows
transcripts under certain conditions.112
Written decisions often list only the win-
ner – or “prevailing party” in NAF parl-
ance – and the amount of money that must
be paid by the loser. NAF’s rules provide
for written explanations of decisions if re-
quested, but require payment of a fee in
advance for such a decision. The fee is
based in part on the amount of money at
stake in the arbitration and can be thou-
sands of dollars. (JAMS rules provide for
a brief written explanation unless the par-
ties waive it. And AAA requires some
written explanation when an award is
made.)
The lack of a written record certainly
lessens the chances that an arbitration rul-
ing will be overturned.
“Arbitration is not an open public
process,” Paul D. Carrington, a Duke Uni-
versity law professor, observed in 2002.
He continued:
“It is clear that this is one of its attractions
to predatory or risk-taking business be-
cause it diminishes the likelihood that the
success of one claim by a consumer or
employee will encourage others like it ....
A public enforcement proceeding serves to
alert the general public to the need for reg-
ulation and enables them to measure the
usefulness of their legal institutions. Se-
cret proceedings or suppressed discovery
material conceal from the public not only
the risk of the harm at issue, but also an
awareness that they are being served by
the law enforcement efforts of their fellow
citizens. Meanwhile, the business respon-
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“Arbitrators in the United States have no en-
forceable duty to inquire into the facts.”
Paul D. Carrington,
Duke University law professor 
dent resolving disputes secretly knows all
about any successful claims and can guide
itself accordingly while his or her adver-
sary negotiates in ignorance.”113
Not only are proceedings secret, informa-
tion on arbitrators is minimal. NAF gives
parties to arbitration a limited voice in
choosing an arbitrator or panel of arbitra-
tors to hear a case. Each party in arbitra-
tion is allowed to strike one prospective
arbitrator, but NAF is reluctant to disclose
information on individual arbitrators with
the exception of those in California, where
the legislature forced its hand. When the
names are given to the parties, they also
receive each arbitrator’s resumé. Still, they
are given no information on the cases they
have handled or their win-loss records. 
Anderson, the NAF managing director,
made clear in a 2002 deposition how lax
NAF rules are regarding potential conflicts
of interests. He said the organization’s
rules do not require arbitrators to disclose
if they have previously been an arbitrator
in a proceeding involving one of the par-
ties or to disclose the results of cases that
they have arbitrated.114
“It would require none of those things un-
less it creates a bias or the risk of bias as
described by the rules,” he said. Yet,
whether there is a risk of bias is a decision
left to the arbitrator.115
Information on bias is usually unavailable
to consumers. In a St. Louis case, an attor-
ney took MBNA to arbitration after it re-
fused to cancel a $3,972.20 charge on his
client’s credit card even though the client
had cancelled the time-share purchase the
charge had helped to finance. Saying he
had a bad experience in a previous case
with an NAF arbitrator, Mitchell B. Stod-
dard, the lawyer, asked NAF for informa-
tion on the arbitrator who would hear the
case, including his or her record of rulings
for companies and for consumers.116
NAF replied curtly, “The information you
have requested is not provided by the
Forum, nor required by the Code of Proce-
dure.”117
II. Arbitrators Have Financial Incen-
tives to Favor Firms that Hire Them
One of the major selling points hawked by
arbitration companies is that their process
keeps disputes away from juries. The
process also puts decisions in the hands of
arbitrators who have a strong incentive to
favor the arbitration companies’ clients.
Paul D. Carrington, a Duke University law
professor, drew some important distinc-
tions between juries and the court system
in a 2002 article. Arbitrators, he wrote, are
“generally screened by an arbitration or-
ganization accustomed to serving business
interests .... [and] almost all formerly con-
nected to business enterprise, or they are
former judges whose judicial work was
approved by businessmen.”
Carrington continued, “Prospective jurors
with the same connections would be ex-
cused from sitting on many of the cases
that the arbitrators decide .... More funda-
mentally objectionable than the appear-
ance of conflicts of interest of arbitrators is
that they are not jurors selected to repre-
sent the community at large.”118
Arbitrators Are Paid Only When 
Assigned Cases
Unlike judges, who are paid the same
salary no matter how many cases they han-
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dle or how they rule, arbitrators are paid
by the case. The more cases they handle,
the more they get paid, Anderson con-
firmed during a 1993 deposition.119
NAF maintains tight control of the selec-
tion of arbitrators. It does allow the parties
to agree on an arbitrator or, in cases over
$75,000, to a panel of arbitrators. NAF
does not publish its roster of arbitrators, so
the parties have to rely on NAF to provide
names of candidates to handle each case.
NAF picks a single arbitrator – in cases
under $75,000 – while giving each party
one chance to eliminate an arbitrator. NAF
presumably submits names one-at-a-time
until all strikes are used. After an arbitrator
is chosen, the parties have the opportunity
to file a motion seeking disqualification of
the arbitrator.120 In at least some cases,
NAF provides a list of arbitrators while al-
lowing the parties an opportunity to strike
one name.121
In a perverse twist, Anderson defended the
system as one that assures the arbitrators’
neutrality. In a sworn deposition in 2001,
Anderson was asked about arbitrator pay.
He responded, “If they don’t handle any
cases that come through our system, we
don’t pay them anything.”122
Asked if he had ever “contemplated put-
ting the arbitrators on salary,” he re-
sponded, “No. One of the issues that
comes up if the arbitrators are on salary is
the issue of neutrality ... we think it’s im-
portant that the arbitrators be independent
contractors and have their obligations or
their code of professional responsibility
obligations as lawyers.”123
Ruling Against the Company Has
Consequences
Elizabeth Bartholet’s brief career as an
NAF arbitrator ended abruptly after she
ruled against a credit card company.
A Harvard Law School professor and vet-
eran arbitrator, Bartholet said in an inter-
view that she was recruited by NAF.124
Beginning in 2003, she handled about 19
cases involving one credit card company
in a 14-month period, as she testified in a
sworn deposition in September 2006.125
She ruled for the company 18 times and
the 19th case was dismissed. Then came
the 20th case. After the company filed an
arbitration claim, the debtor asserted a
counterclaim. She awarded the debtor
about $48,000.126
Subsequently, she said, NAF removed her
from seven credit card cases she was
scheduled to handle and told the debtors
Bartholet could not handle them because
she had a scheduling conflict, an assertion
she denied. In addition, she testified that
credit card companies voluntarily dis-
missed another four cases that had been on
her agenda.127
Bartholet testified that she asked an NAF
employee if “there could be any reason for
them disqualifying me other than the fact
that I ruled against them in Case Y” – the
$48,000 award to the credit card holder.
“She said no,” Bartholet testified. “She ba-
sically agreed that that was the reason and
in response to my concern about this mis-
leading letter about my unavailability hav-
ing been sent out, she said that it was a
form letter that was simply regularly sent
out in all of the cases.”128
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Bartholet resigned as an arbitrator in Feb-
ruary 2005, citing concern for NAF ethics
and “its apparent systematic bias in favor
of the financial services industry.”129
She acknowledged in her testimony that
she became troubled about NAF even be-
fore her resignation, saying she had “de-
veloped some increasing anxiety as I
decided these cases and got briefing in
some cases indicating problems that had
been raised about NAF and it is true that I
worried given that all these cases were just
on the papers and that it seemed as if one
side was represented and the other wasn’t
that I worried about the fairness so I did
my best and I did feel capable of rendering
a decision in all of those cases I decided
that I felt comfortable with.130
Richard Hodge, a judge-turned-arbitrator,
expressed a similar sentiment.
“I have had an insurance company that
very noticeably did not hire me further
after I ruled against them in arbitration,”
Hodge said. “You would have to be uncon-
scious not to be aware that if you rule a
certain way, you can compromise your fu-
ture business.”131
Said J. Anthony Kline, a California appel-
late justice: “Private judging is an oxy-
moron because those judges [in
arbitration] are businessmen. They are in
this for money.”132 The stakes are high.
While California Superior Court judges
earn $171,648, top arbitrators charge up to
$10,000 per day. Some make $1 million a
year.133
A Consumer Lawyer’s Experience in
Michigan
Rochelle E. Guznack is an attorney in Ply-
mouth, Mich., whose practice includes
representation of consumers in debt collec-
tion cases. She told Public Citizen about
two recent experiences with NAF arbitra-
tors that she found troubling.134
In each case, Guznack represented a credit
card holder who had been taken to arbitra-
tion. Both clients wanted an in-person
hearing and paid a $250 fee.
In one case brought by MBNA, the Forum
assigned an arbitrator located more than
three hours from Guznack’s office. After
she objected, NAF substituted an arbitrator
who was an hour away. MBNA failed to
send anyone to the hearing – or to have a
representative appear by phone, as NAF
rules allow, she said. So the arbitrator had
no information on the case. And, she
added, “He said he didn’t have a copy of
the [credit card] agreement – he never
does. And he asked me what my client
owed.”
Guznack told him she would not help
MBNA make its case and she demanded
that he dismiss the case with prejudice.
“I said, ‘If we were in court, this case
would be thrown out, dismissed with prej-
udice.’ He agreed,” Guznack said.
When the arbitrator wanted to reschedule
the hearing, Guznack said, “I told him I
would not agree to reschedule and that I
believed he had no choice but to find an
award in favor of my client.”
Guznack said the arbitrator refused to take
any action, instead saying he would have
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to consult NAF. Several weeks later, Guz-
nack received notification that the case
against her client had been dismissed with
prejudice. 
In the second case, in late August, Guz-
nack had an arbitrator who exhibited what
she called “astounding bias in favor of the
creditor,” Chase Bank.
Guznack learned just prior to the hearing
that the lawyer for Chase had sent her
client documents the firm planned to use at
the hearing, but had not sent them to her.
“I complained and asked that the docu-
ments be stricken,” Guznack said.
The arbitrator refused to strike the docu-
ments, even after Guznack reminded her
that NAF rules required that they be sent
to the respondent’s attorney 10 days before
the hearing.
“She responded that she had the discretion
to disregard that rule,” Guznack said.
Then, after calling NAF to discuss the sit-
uation, the arbitrator claimed that the
Chase attorney was not aware that Guz-
nack’s client had an attorney.
Guznack noted that she had told NAF she
represented the cardholder and that NAF
had addressed several letters both to her
and to the Chase attorney. However, Guz-
nack said, nothing in her address on the
letters indicated that she represented
client. “Apparently, I did not warrant an
‘Esq.’ or the mention of my law firm
name,” she said.
The arbitrator ruled that the documents
would be admitted. “I was given the
choice of one hour to review the docu-
ments or rescheduling the hearing. We
opted for rescheduling the hearing .....
I have not yet found anything unbiased
about the NAF,” Guznack said.
‘Repeat Player’ Bias at NAF
One of the major problems with arbitration
is a documented lack of neutrality on the
part of arbitration firms that is called the
“repeat player effect.” This is a situation in
which a built-in bias develops in favor of
the claimant that frequently sends business
to the arbitration firm in the form of
claims against its customers, who are usu-
ally participating for the first-time. 
• In California, the state Court of Appeal
ruled in 2002 that an arbitration clause
involving an employment contract – in
which the employer designated NAF
as the arbitration forum – was uncon-
scionable in part because of the repeat
player effect.135
“The fact that an employer repeatedly
appears before the same group of arbi-
trators conveys distinct advantages
over the individual employee,” the
court said in a 2002 opinion.136 It cited
an earlier case where the court major-
ity wrote, “Various studies show that
arbitration is advantageous to employ-
ers not only because it reduces the
costs of litigation, but also because it
reduces the size of the award that an
employee is likely to get, particularly
if the employer is a ‘repeat player’ in
the arbitration system.”137
The opinion was published by the
court, meaning that it could be cited as
precedent in future cases. That obvi-
ously troubled NAF, which unsuccess-
fully asked the California Supreme
Court to “depublish” the opinion – a
step that would not have affected the
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outcome of that case but would have
eliminated the opinion as a precedent
to be cited in future court cases.138
• In another case, this one involving a
temporary hearing officer hired on an
“ad hoc” basis, the California Supreme
Court said in 2002, “While the adjudi-
cator’s pay is not formally dependent
on the outcome of the litigation, his or
her future income as an adjudicator is
entirely dependent on the goodwill of a
prosecuting agency that is free to se-
lect its adjudicators and that must,
therefore, be presumed to favor its own
rational self-interest by preferring
those who tend to issue favorable rul-
ings.”
The court strongly suggested that the
repeat player effect is a threat to funda-
mental rights, saying, “The require-
ments of due process are flexible,
especially where administrative proce-
dure is concerned, but they are strict in
condemning the risk of bias that arises
when an adjudicator's future income
from judging depends on the goodwill
of frequent litigants who pay the adju-
dicator’s fee.”139
• Academic research shows strong proof
of a “repeat player effect” in BMA,
providing evidence that companies that
use an arbitration provider repeatedly
tend to do better than a party that ap-
pears only once.
o Michael Geist, a law professor at
the University of Ottawa, did a sta-
tistical analysis of more than 3,000
arbitrations of disputes over Inter-
net domain names that were con-
ducted between 1999 and July
2001. He concluded that NAF and
another arbitration firm used a
process for designating arbitrators
for these cases that “appears to be
heavily biased toward ensuring that
a majority of cases are steered to-
ward complainant-friendly pan-
elists.”140
“I concluded that the NAF dispro-
portionately assigned arbitrators
who issued pro-complainant rul-
ings, and thus exerted influence
over the outcomes of arbitrations in
the UDRP [Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute Resolution Policy]
system in order to market itself fa-
vorably to complainants, who have
the exclusive power to choose
whether the NAF or a different
provider will earn their business,”
Geist said in a sworn declaration
filed in 2005 in a North Carolina
court case.141
o In a 1997 study of employment
cases, Lisa B. Bingham, now Pro-
fessor of Public Service at Indiana
University’s School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, found that
employees facing a repeat-player
employer in arbitration recovered
11 percent of what they demanded
while those facing non-repeat-play-
ers recovered 48 percent of what
they demanded.142
The record of NAF shows the risk of a re-
peat-player effect is substantial. The firm
handles many cases for its major clients –
for example, MBNA, which provided it
with more than 18,000 arbitration cases in
California alone between Jan. 1, 2003, and
March 31, 2007.143
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Paul D. Carrington, a Duke University
Law professor, wrote about the repeat-
player effect in a 2002 article: “Many pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, as they are
written, load the dice to the advantage of
the repeat player drafting” the arbitration
agreement.144
III. Arbitration Often Costs Consumers
More than Court
The limited information available on the
cost of going before NAF makes it clear
that arbitration is not a cheaper alternative
to the courts – at least not for the con-
sumer. Indeed, the consumer pays dearly
when forced into arbitration.
The NAF fee schedule is daunting for the
average person. If a consumer brings a
complaint against a vendor before the
NAF, fees can run into the thousands of
dollars – far more than it would cost to
bring the same complaint in a federal or
state court.
NAF’s fee schedule is set to a sliding scale
– the higher the amount a claimant seeks
in arbitration, the higher the fees – creat-
ing a deterrent to pursuing large claims.
And NAF requires advance payment of
fees for virtually any step that a party
takes in an arbitration proceeding – for ex-
ample, obtaining a written explanation that
lays out the rationale for the arbitrator’s
decision. NAF’s system also includes a
“loser pays” rule, creating a risk of liabil-
ity for those who pursue cases in the sys-
tem of for-profit justice.
Sometimes, the corporation responding to
a consumer complaint picks up part or all
of the tab. But there is no guarantee. 
In one case, Alex Karakhanov used two
credit cards to pay for a time share con-
tract in Mexico – $6,200 on a Citibank
card and $3,972.20 on an MBNA card.
The contract included a 10-working-day
cancellation window with full refund.
After the seller refused to accept a cancel-
lation, Karakhanov persuaded Citibank to
charge back the $6,200 to the seller but
MBNA refused his request for a charge
back. Karakhanov sued MBNA in federal
court and the judge forced him to go to ar-
bitration under his credit card agreement.
He filed a case against MBNA at the Na-
tional Arbitration Forum seeking $200,000
in damages. MBNA agreed to pay the arbi-
tration fees, which amounted to more than
$8,000.145
For the $1,500 paid for the “written find-
ings of fact/ conclusions of law and rea-
sons for award,” the arbitrator produced a
three-page decision. (Interestingly, when
the written decision arrived, it wasn’t
signed by the arbitrator who held a hear-
ing. Instead, another arbitrator with a simi-
lar name signed it. After Mitchell B.
Stoddard, Karakhanov’s attorney, pointed
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NAF Fees in Karakhanov Case146
Filing fee 
(Based $200,000 claim) $1,075
Hearing Procedural Fee $100
Participatory Hearing Fee, 
first 3-hour session $4,000
Participatory Hearing fee,
second 3-hour session $1,500
Request for written findings 
of fact/conclusions of law 
and reasons for award $1,500
Total $8,175
this out, NAF sent a new copy signed by
the arbitrator who heard the case.)147
In another case, involving racial discrimi-
nation claims against a Washington-area
auto dealer over the financing terms of car
sales, the lawyer for a half-dozen
claimants calculated that each of his
clients would have to pay more than
$14,000 in NAF fees. 
Four individuals and two couples, all
African American, filed suit in federal
court against Jim Koons Automotive Com-
panies, a major Washington D.C. dealer-
ship. They alleged that they had been
victims of racial discrimination because
they were charged higher interest rates
than similarly situated white customers
when they financed their purchases
through the dealership. The court required
them to take the case to arbitration before
NAF because the “Buy Order” for their
purchases (though not the financing agree-
ment that was the focus of their com-
plaints) contained a binding mandatory
arbitration clause.148
They filed six individual claims with NAF
ranging from $153,650.94 to $170.364.11
and totaling nearly $1 million.149
Their attorneys estimated that the NAF
fees for each of the six individual claims
would be $14,300. If the complaints were
consolidated into a single case, the fees
would be $7,908 each. Under NAF rules,
the attorneys asked that NAF require
Koons to pay their clients’ fees because
their clients could not afford them.150
NAF appointed three arbitrators to make a
decision on the requests for fee-shifting.
One arbitrator handled three complaints,
one handled two and one handled a single
complaint. The arbitrator handling the sin-
gle case, Carroll E. Dubuc, granted a com-
plainant’s request for fee-shifting, while
the other two arbitrators turned down all
the requests.151
Subsequently, Koons asked for reconsider-
ation of Dubuc’s decision. According to
Bradley Blower, one of the claimants’ at-
torneys, Koons also “moved to disqualify”
Dubuc from deciding the fee-shifting re-
quest.152
Dubuc then reversed the decision and in
February 2007 denied the request for fee-
shifting.
The claimants then sought an injunction to
prevent Koons from pursuing arbitration
on the grounds that the NAF fees were un-
conscionable. Faced with the possibility
that the judge would grant the request and
allow the case to be tried in court before a
jury, Koons agreed to pay the com-
plainants’ NAF fees. As a result, the re-
quest for an injunction was denied.153
In August 2007, the parties settled and the
court case was dismissed with prejudice.154
In Ohio, a former television anchor sued,
claiming age discrimination, after being
fired. The consumer countered that his em-
ployment contract required that disputes
be settled in arbitration under American
Arbitration Association procedures. The
plaintiff, Peter B. Scovill, estimated that
arbitration would cost him between
$15,000 and $20,000 at a time when he
was without a salary. In addition, he was
threatened, under the “loser pays” terms of
his employment agreement, with having to
pay the consumers’ arbitration costs if he
lost the case.
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Agreeing that arbitration would cost Scov-
ill at least $15,000, the judge contrasted
that with the $150 federal court filing fee
(now $350). He wrote, “In contrast with
the arbitral forum, a litigant never incurs a
room rental fee or hourly fee from the
judge when litigating.”155
In a ruling upheld on appeal, the judge de-
cided that the cost provisions of the arbi-
tration agreement were unenforceable and
essentially agreed with arbitration critics
who say the high fees are designed to dis-
courage challenges to corporations.
He wrote, “The provisions for cost-shift-
ing and potential payment of the em-
ployer’s attorney’s fees contained in the
arbitration provision in this case present a
substantial deterrent to arbitration for the
defined class of potential litigants in this
case.”156
In 2004, Mark E. Budnitz, a professor of
law at the Georgia State University Col-
lege of Law, looked askance at the NAF
fee schedule for claims of more than
$75,000. “The substantial increase in the
fees for claims of $75,000 and higher may
create a strong incentive for consumers to
claim less than the law would allow,” he
wrote. “This perverse incentive under-
mines important objectives underpinning
consumer protection legislation: deterring
and remedying egregious commercial con-
duct, and compensating consumers for in-
juries suffered.”157 The differences in fees
are significant, as these charts show.
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National Arbitration Forum Fees
Participatory
Claim Filing Commencement Administrative Hearing
Amount Fee Fee Fee Session
$2,500 or less $25 $25 $200 $150
$2,501-5,000 $35 $35 $250 $150
$5,001-10,000 $35 $35 $350 $300
$10,001-15,000 $35 $35 $450 $300
$15,001-30,000 $60 $60 $650 $500
$30,001-50,000 $110 $110 $950 $750
$50,001-74,999 $240 $240 $1,250 $950
$75,000 -125,000 $300 $300 $500 Arbitrator hourly
rate
$125,001-250,000 $400 $400 $750 Arbitrator hourly
rate
$250,001-500,000 $500 $500 $1,000 Arbitrator hourly
rate
$500,001-1,000,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,250 Arbitrator hourly
rate
$1,000,001-5,000,000 $1,750 $1,750 $1,500 Arbitrator hourly
rate
Source: National Arbitration Forum
Filing Fees for Arbitration Compared to Various Court Systems
NAF AAA Mich. Calif. Md. Federal
Filing Fee $1,750 $6,000 $150 $320 $105 $350
NAF May Be Concealing Fees as 
Part of Awards
NAF records suggest that the company is
concealing fees paid by consumers in the
public disclosures about consumer arbitra-
tion it must make in California.
Documents obtained in one California case
– and NAF’s limited public disclosures in
the same case – suggest that NAF works
with at least one major debt collection
firm, Wolpoff & Abramson, to secretly
slap credit card holders with a big bill that
covers arbitration costs beyond attorney
fees.
In that case, Wolpoff & Abramson initiated
arbitration against an MBNA account
holder by electronically transmitting a
form to NAF. On that form, Wolpoff
sought an award of $17,524.49, the
amount of the cardholder’s debt; interest
of $508.93 “as of the date of filing, and at
10.00% thereafter”.... “plus all arbitration
fees incurred; Process of Service fees and
Attorney Fees of $2,628.67.” The total
came to $20,662.09.158
On Nov. 29, 2005, an arbitrator signed a
document that awarded MBNA
$22,022.64 in this case. In a publicly
available report on the same case, NAF
said that this was the amount that MBNA
had sought in the arbitration, even though
the Wolpoff & Abramson filing showed
that MBNA was seeking $20,662.09.159
This suggests that NAF tacked on
$1,360.55 for its fee. Yet the public report
said “business fees” in the arbitration were
$770 and that there were no “consumer
fees.”
This kind of hidden fee may violate
MBNA’s consumer agreement, which tells
the cardholder, “In no event will you be
required to reimburse us for any arbitra-
tion filing, administrative or hearing fees
in an amount greater than what your court
costs would have been if the Claim had
been resolved in a state court with jurisdic-
tion.”160
In another case, a California man, Kent
Swahn, complained in a lawsuit that an
NAF arbitrator’s award to MBNA of
$14,996.76 “fails to disclose that it in-
cludes not only the amount of MBNA’s
bill, but also approximately $3,000 more
for attorney fees and arbitration costs, both
of which are not allowed under California
law.”161
IV. Arbitration Lacks Civil Courts’
Safeguards to Ensure Fairness
“There are significant procedural and sub-
stantive distinctions between arbitration
proceedings and litigation,” a Federal
Trade Commission official told Congress
in 2000.
“By signing a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment, borrowers waive their right to a jury
trial, and the ability to pursue claims
through class action litigation,” David Me-
dine, the FTC’s associate director for fi-
nancial practices, testified before the
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Award in California Case
Principal balance $17,524.49
Interest $508.93
Process of service and
attorney fees: 
(15% of principal balance) $2,628.97
Subtotal $20,662.09
Arbitration Fees Amount not listed
Grand Total $22,022.64
(Apparent Arbitration Fee $1,360.55)
House Banking and Financial Services
Committee.162 “In arbitration, there is also
limited factual discovery, and remedies
such as punitive damages and injunctive
relief are typically unavailable. A decision
by an arbitrator in one case has no prece-
dential value; indeed, there is no require-
ment that the decision-maker give any
reasons for the decision. Thus, predatory
lenders can shield their abusive practices
from public scrutiny.
“Perhaps most importantly, mandatory ar-
bitration agreements undermine con-
sumers’ ability to exercise statutory rights
.... which were passed to protect con-
sumers in the credit marketplace. Review
of arbitration awards is very limited.”
Quoting a 1994 book on arbitration, Me-
dine concluded, “Arbitrators can miscon-
strue contracts, make erroneous decisions
of fact, and misapply law, all without hav-
ing their awards vacated.”163
Parties Have Reduced Discovery Rights
Discovery, the process in which parties in
a dispute seek information from each other
prior to trial, is limited. In cases in which
the parties do not cooperate in exchanging
information, NAF rules severely limit the
information that can be sought.
A party may seek sworn answers to no
more than 25 written questions and one or
more depositions with the provisos that:
• The information is “relevant ....  reli-
able and informative to the arbitrator.”
• Cost has to be “commensurate with the
amount of the claim.”
• The request for the information “is rea-
sonable and not unduly burdensome
and expensive.” 
If a party refuses to answer a discovery re-
quest, the arbitrator “shall promptly deter-
mine whether sufficient reason exists for
the discovery and issue an order.” The ar-
bitrator is also allowed to draw “unfavor-
able, adverse inference” from the failure to
provide discovery and may impose sanc-
tions.
Witnesses can be subpoenaed, but the arbi-
trator must issue the subpoena and an arbi-
trator has the discretion to turn down the
request for a subpoena if the request does
not demonstrate “the relevancy and relia-
bility of the documents, property or testi-
mony” sought by the subpoena.164
“Arbitrators in the United States have no
enforceable duty to inquire into the facts,”
Carrington wrote in 2001. “While they
have a subpoena power, they need not use
it and parties presenting their cases to an
arbitrator have no right to compel the testi-
mony of witnesses or the production of
documents unless the arbitrator chooses to
require it.”165
The detrimental effects of weak discovery
provisions are compounded by the fact
that arbitration’s secrecy prevents litigants
from learning the history of cases similar
to theirs, inhibiting the development of
legal precedent.
Other due process rights, such as the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial enshrined in
the 7th Amendment, also suffer. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal slapped down Bank
of America in 1998, saying that a bill
stuffer that the bank began using in 1992
was not sufficient for making an important
change in an agreement between two par-
ties. The court acted after four Bank of
America credit card holders and two con-
sumer organizations sued.
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“The Bank’s interpretation of the change
of terms provision would dispense with
the requirement for a clear and unmistak-
able indication that the customer intended
to waive the right to a jury trial. Because
we find no unambiguous and unequivocal
waiver of that right here, and because the
right to select a judicial forum, whether a
bench trial or a jury trial, as distinguished
from arbitration or some other method of
dispute resolution, is a substantial right not
lightly to be deemed waived .... the Bank’s
interpretation of the change of terms pro-
vision must be rejected.”166
Arbitration Appeals Process is Limited,
Confusing and Extremely Difficult
Arbitration systems provide litigants less
information on their rights to appeal than
the court system and litigants’ rights are
also severely limited.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, losers
in arbitration have three months to appeal.
The NAF document that informs con-
sumers that they have lost in arbitration
does not inform them of this deadline.167
Public Citizen’s examination of documents
in numerous arbitration cases shows that
victorious credit card companies and debt
collectors usually wait until the 90-day
deadline has passed before they go to court
seeking confirmation of the award. By
then, consumers’ appeal options are over.
Even when consumers meet the appeal
deadline and successfully navigate the
process, satisfaction can be elusive be-
cause the Federal Arbitration Act and
caselaw severely limit the grounds for
courts to vacate an award. Awards can be
overturned if they were procured by fraud,
corruption or other undue means; if the ar-
bitrator displayed “evident partiality or
corruption,” or “where the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers, or so imperfectly ex-
ecuted them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.”168
In many other cases, appeals have proven
futile.
• The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit ruled in 2006 that the fact
that an arbitrator’s interpretation of a
contract is “wacky” is insufficient
grounds for court review of the deci-
sion. “It is tempting to think that courts
are engaged in judicial review of arbi-
tration awards under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, but they are not,” a three
judge panel of the Seventh U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in 2006. “When
parties agree to arbitrate their disputes
they opt out of the court system….
That is why in the typical arbitration,
which ... is concerned with interpreting
a contract, the issue for the court is not
whether the contract interpretation is
incorrect or even wacky but whether
the arbitrators had failed to interpret
the contract at all,” the opinion said.169
• Other appeals court decisions have
found that there were insufficient
grounds for review of an arbitration
decision even if it was “silly,” or
would “cause substantial injustice,” or
“merely misinterpreted, misstated or
misapplied the law.”170
• In one case, an evidently angry federal
appeals court harshly criticized appeals
from arbitration awards. In a chilling
statement that would make a prospec-
tive appellant think twice, a three-
judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit wrote
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in 2006 that it “is exasperated by those
who attempt to salvage arbitration
losses through litigation that has no
sound basis in the law applicable to ar-
bitration awards. The warning this
opinion provides is that in order to fur-
ther the purposes of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act and to protect arbitration as
a remedy we are ready, willing, and
able to consider imposing sanctions in
appropriate cases.”171
• After MBNA sought court confirma-
tion of three arbitration awards against
a Maryland woman totaling more than
$50,000, a judge affirmed the award
after the credit card company’s lawyer
argued that she had missed the appeal
deadline.172
Case closed – even though MBNA and
NAF had gone ahead with the arbitra-
tion despite Patricia Meisse’s assertion
that she was the victim of identity
theft, disregarding her demand that
MBNA prove that they were her ac-
counts.173
The National Consumer Law Center,
which publicized Meisse’s case in
2005, said, “She also did not partici-
pate in the arbitration because it was
her understanding that she’d be re-
quired to travel from her home in
Maryland to NAF’s Minneapolis head-
quarters to attend three separate arbi-
tration proceedings. The fact that most
consumers reading the NAF arbitration
notice assume they will have to travel
to Minneapolis is yet another aspect of
mandatory arbitration’s gross unfair-
ness to consumers.”174
Asked if she had filed an appeal within
the 90-day deadline, Meisse subse-
quently testified in a deposition, “No. I
thought, I have to tell you, I was naïve
enough when this whole thing started
that I believed that the laws were there
to protect the consumers. As it turns
out, the laws are not there to protect
the consumers.”175
Richard Hodge, a former California
judge turned arbitrator, put it this way,
“The fact is that arbitrators make mis-
takes ... and there is no appeal if I
make a stupid or diabolical mistake, or
one that is made in bad faith. The par-
ties are on their own.”176
Only the Rare Appeal Succeeds, with
High Costs for Consumers
Sometimes, an arbitration award is over-
turned on appeal, as shown by the Troy
Cornock case in New Hampshire de-
scribed at the beginning of this report. In
Cornock’s case, the judge found that
MBNA failed to prove that he – not his es-
tranged wife – had opened the account or
to show that he had used the account.
Cornock succeeded because he had an at-
torney who pursued the appeal vigorously.
In a more recent case, a New York judge
threw out an arbitration award to MBNA
on similar grounds even though the credit
card holder had not responded to the arbi-
tration proceeding or the subsequent court
case in which MBNA sought confirmation
of the award. Even without the credit card
holder’s participation in the arbitration or
court case, Judge Philip S. Straniere of the
Civil Court of the City of New York,
closely scrutinized MBNA’s documents.
He listed seven separate grounds for re-
jecting the NAF arbitration award of
$9,459.70 against Paul E. Nelson.177
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Staniere wrote in a June 19, 2007, decision
that he often analyzes evidence presented
by credit card companies seeking confir-
mation of arbitration awards and finds
“fatal procedural and substantive defects”
in the company filings.178Alluding to the
fact that arbitration cases often involve ac-
counts that have been sold for mere pen-
nies per dollar, Staniere wrote, “the
incentive therefore, for the firm purchas-
ing the debt, is to herd these cases into ar-
bitration and churn out papers seeking
their confirmation as quickly as possible.
The entire industry is a game of odds, and
in the end as long as enough awards are
confirmed to make up for the initial sale
and costs of operation the purchase is
deemed a successful business venture.”
“However, during this process mistakes
are made, mistakes that may seriously im-
pact consumers and their credit,” he wrote.
The Nelson case he was reviewing “is a
specimen replete with such defects and the
Court takes this opportunity to analyze the
filing in detail, in hopes to persuade credi-
tors, not simply to take more care in dot-
ting their ‘i’s’ and crossing their ‘t’s’ in
their filings, but to assure a minimum level
of due process to the respondents.”179
While Arbitration Firms Make the Rules,
They Don’t Always Follow Them
Arbitration firms have elaborate rules of
procedure for handling disputes – and, in
practice, near-total freedom to ignore these
rules. 
The experience of an Alabama lawyer in
2007 raises questions about how seriously
– if at all – NAF takes its rules. NAF Rule
of Procedure 21 states, “an Arbitrator shall
be disqualified if circumstances exist that
create a conflict of interest or cause the Ar-
bitrator to be unfair or biased, including
but not limited to the following ...” [Em-
phasis added.]
The second item listed is: “The Arbitrator
has served as an attorney to any Party, the
Arbitrator has been associated with an at-
torney who has represented a Party during
that association, or the Arbitrator or an as-
sociated attorney is a material witness con-
cerning the matter before the arbitrator.”180
In Alabama, attorney Penny Hays Cauley
represented a Cibitank credit card holder
in an arbitration case. When she received
the resumé of the NAF arbitrator in the
case, a business lawyer, she wondered if
he had represented Citibank. So, she wrote
to NAF, saying that his “resumé indicates
that he has represented financial institu-
tions such as Citibank, as well as creditors
in bankruptcy proceedings.”
Saying that his “resumé creates the ap-
pearance that [he] has a bias in favor of fi-
nancial institutions,” she asked for
information on all arbitrations he had han-
dled for Citibank and other financial insti-
tution and asked that his appointment be
held in abeyance pending disclosure. In
the alternative, she wanted him replaced
by a new arbitrator.181
NAF turned her down on three grounds: 
1) Cauley did not meet the deadline for
such requests; 2) Her request did not state
the “circumstances and specific material
reasons” for the request as required by the
NAF Code of Procedure; and 3) “Finally,
please note that the National Arbitration
Forum is not required to provide the addi-
tional information about the Arbitrator that
you requested.”182
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And then, as if to rap Cauley on the
knuckles for her audacity, Kelly M. Wilen,
an NAF case coordinator, wrote, “the Re-
spondent’s request and this correspon-
dence will be forwarded to the Arbitrator
for review during the Hearing.”183
A “Moving” Experience
Gregory Duhl has had his own problems
with NAF. In 2003, when the law profes-
sor moved from Illinois to Pennsylvania,
some of his property was damaged by the
moving company, he explained in a decla-
ration filed in a court case. Under terms of
his contract with the mover, he filed a
claim with NAF against Suburban Moving
& Storage Company.184
“My experience with NAF was deeply
troubling,” he wrote. “In a variety of ways,
I found that the NAF implemented (or re-
fused to follow) its rules in ways that fa-
vored Suburban and disfavored me, the
consumer.”
Duhl wrote that NAF:
• Allowed Suburban to file a late sub-
mission without following NAF rules
for late submissions.
• Refused to consider motions on “pro-
cedural irregularities” that he filed.
“An NAF program administrator re-
fused to even accept my motions, and
the NAF clerk refused to permit me to
be heard, notwithstanding the NAF
rules that authorized these motions.”
• Required him to hand-write the case
number on each page of a 150-page
document and required him to copy
and mail copies of his documents to
NAF and Suburban – while allowing
Suburban to file documents by fax.
“After some time,” Duhl wrote, “I found
the NAF’s procedural bias against me to
be so pervasive and blatant that it no
longer made sense to go forward. As a re-
sult, I was forced to abandon my claim,
and I settled the matter with Suburban for
far less than it was worth.”185
NAF’s rules accord its staff broad powers
that in court cases often would be en-
trusted only to judges – not to clerks. Staff
members are allowed to rule on motions,
requests for time extensions, requests for
stays and disqualification of arbitrators.
In Orange County, Calif., attorney Aurora
Dawn Harris, representing a credit card
holder in an NAF arbitration, was sur-
prised recently when she filed a brief re-
questing attorney fees and was
“immediately” turned down by an NAF
employee, Jill Surine.
She wrote back to case-coordinator Surine:
“The documents I just filed were not in-
tended for you but for the proposed Arbi-
trator ... Since you are ruling on these
matters, I would like a copy of your re-
sumé. There is no information about you
available on the Internet.”186
Harris said Surine responded that she had
the authority under the NAF Code of Pro-
cedure to make such rulings and that NAF
was “not required to submit to the parties
the resumé of any of its employees.”
In an e-mail to Public Citizen, Harris said
that in California courts, “a judge, not a
clerk, rules on all motions or requests” un-
less all parties agree to allow a lawyer
serving as an interim judge to make the
ruling. She said she was unable to find
Surine’s name on state bar listings in Cali-
fornia and Minnesota.
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“I can’t believe it,” Harris wrote. “This
woman has denied at least 7 or 8 ‘requests’
I have made in the case…”187
Arbitration Agreements Typically Prohibit
Class Action Lawsuits
The same contracts that require binding
mandatory arbitration often ban customers
from joining class action lawsuits and
class arbitrations. Such a ban means that
corporate fraud and abuse may go utterly
unchecked. 
A consumer whose complaint may only be
worth, for example, $1,000 or $2,000, is
unlikely to find a lawyer willing to take
the case. But if the same consumer joins
with similarly situated people in a class ac-
tion, the likelihood of getting a lawyer to
bring the claim increases considerably.
Thus, a prohibition on class action suits or
arbitrations can mean that credit card or
other companies do not have to answer for
misdeeds that garner millions of dollars
for them while harming thousands of their
customers.
“When consumers are overcharged a mod-
est amount but it affects many people, then
a class-action suit is the only way to go
against credit card companies in an effi-
cient way,” Jean Ann Fox, director of con-
sumer protection for the Consumers
Federation of America, said in 2001.188
Six years later, the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington put it this way:
“When consumer claims are small but nu-
merous, a class-based remedy is the only
effective method to vindicate the public’s
rights…. Class remedies not only resolve
the claims of the individual class members
but can also strongly deter future similar
wrongful conduct, which benefits the com-
munity as a whole ....Without class ac-
tions, many meritorious claims would
never be brought.”189
JAMS, a 28-year old national arbitration
firm founded by a retired California judge,
briefly bucked the “no class-action” trend
in its arbitration practice. In November
2004, JAMS announced it would allow
class-wide arbitrations even where its
clients’ arbitration clauses explicitly
banned them, indicating that the prohibi-
tion unfairly curtails consumer rights.190
“JAMS unequivocally takes the position
that it is inappropriate for a company to re-
strict the right of a consumer to be a mem-
ber of a class action arbitration or to
initiate a class action arbitration,” the
firm’s press release said. “JAMS will not
enforce these clauses in class action arbi-
trations and will require that they be
waived in individual cases.”191
The move immediately sparked a backlash
from the companies that had designated
JAMS as their arbitration provider.
“A number of these clients, including Dis-
cover and Citibank, swiftly changed their
contracts to remove JAMS as an accept-
able forum for arbitrating disputes,” Myr-
iam Gilles, a professor at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, wrote in the
Michigan Law Review.192 Subsequently, in
March 2005, JAMS abandoned the policy,
saying that the policy “suggested to some
that JAMS had deviated from its core
value of neutrality” and had “created con-
cern and confusion about how the policy
would be applied.”193
The policies of the arbitration providers
matter in this area, because the Supreme
Court decided in 2003 that in cases where
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In April 2006, a California judge
sharply criticized MBNA, Bank One and
other unnamed credit card companies,
along with NAF, saying their “so-called
arbitrations” amounted to a denial of due
process.
San Mateo County Superior Court
Judge Gerald J. Buchwald criticized Bank
One Delaware NA and NAF for holding
arbitration proceedings far from the
homes of credit card holders and denied
Bank One’s request for confirmation of
an arbitration award of approximately
$10,000 against Edric E.A. Greene. The
judge noted that the faulty arbitration pro-
ceeding was a “document hearing” by ar-
bitrator Steven Bromberg in Los Angeles
on March 25, 2004.”194
(NAF California reports show that
Bromberg, now a Superior Court judge in
Orange County, signed 27 NAF arbitra-
tions on that day, awarding Bank One,
MBNA and a third firm, Appleton Capital
LLC, every penny they sought.)195
In his decision in the Greene case,
Judge Buchwald wrote, “This was a doc-
ument review of account information
submitted by Bank One without any ap-
pearance by Mr. Greene, without any sub-
mission of documents from Mr. Greene,
and without any actual evidentiary hear-
ing.” 
He noted that the location of the “so-
called arbitration” violated Bank One’s
credit card agreement with Greene to
hold arbitration proceedings in the federal
judicial district where he lives.196
Greene lives in Burlingame, in the
jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, while
Los Angeles is in the Southern District,
nearly 400 miles from Burlingame.197
“Approximately ten or so substan-
tially identical other Petitions to Confirm
Arbitration” involving NAF arbitrations
of “collection claims” by credit card com-
panies against San Mateo County resi-
dents were done at about the same time in
Southern California, Buchwald wrote.
He continued: “Given this context, it
appears that the arbitration procedures
which Bank One used here, in Mr.
Greene’s case, are consistent with a
broader approach by which Bank One
and other credit card issuers using NAF
arbitrators are actively discouraging
credit cardholders in San Mateo County
from having any actual evidentiary arbi-
tration hearing by routinely setting such
arbitrations in Southern California, or at
some other patently inconvenient venue,
where the cardholder’s ability to take off
work to travel to an arbitration hearing
and the costs of doing so are often dispro-
portionate to the amount of past due bal-
ance in dispute.”
“That is, it is not just in this one case
of Mr. Greene’s, but in several other
cases that Bank One and other NAF users
are systematically denying San Mateo
County cardholders the due process of a
full and fair hearing in the San Francisco
Bay area as per their own cardholder
agreements.”198
Buchwald concluded, “Bank One’s
failure to afford its San Mateo County
resident cardholders the opportunity of an
actual evidentiary arbitration hearing,
while at the same time using its arbitra-
tion clause in the cardholder agreement to
effect a waiver of the cardholder’s access
to the court’s usual process for civil col-
lection actions, is a denial of due process
.... The denial of due process is particu-
Judge Rules Arbitration Awards Are Denial of Due Process
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larly clear here, where Mr. Greene received
neither notice of the arbitration nor advice
of the award prior to his receipt of this peti-
tion.”
“When there is such a denial of due
process and a party has been denied the op-
portunity of a fair and full Arbitration hear-
ing, the usual deference paid to arbitration
agreements by the courts does not apply
and it is clear that the Court should decline
to honor the Arbitration award.”199
In a footnote, the judge wrote that
Greene acted as his own counsel in the
court case “and also gave sworn testimony
that service of notice of hearing on this pe-
tition was the first actual notice he received
of any arbitration proceedings, let alone an
adverse award. The fact that fair notice of
the so-called arbitration is thus disputed re-
inforces this court’s conclusion that the ar-
bitration award was obtained by ‘….other
undue means….’ within the meaning of”
California law. 200
In a similar case decided on the same
day, Buchwald denied MBNA’s request for
confirmation of an arbitration award, writ-
ing, “The Court believes that the alleged
arbitration award here was likely procured
by undue means, with the cardholder Ms.
Baker being denied appropriate due
process.”201
the arbitration agreement does not mention
class action arbitration, it is up to the arbi-
trator to decide whether the class action
moves forward.202 
Another national arbitration firm, the
American Arbitration Association (AAA),
says it permits class arbitrations only in
cases where the arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties does not mention “class
claims, consolidation, or joinder of
claims.”203AAA maintains a database of
class arbitrations on its Web site.204
Yet AAA also buckled when the corporate
heat was applied, earning a verbal lashing
from a federal judge. Customers across the
country filed at least 70 class action law-
suits against long distance telephone serv-
ice providers, alleging that the companies
overcharged them. The cases were consoli-
dated in a U.S. District Court in Kansas
and the judge granted the motions of
Sprint and AT&T to send some of the
cases to arbitration.205
One plaintiff, Thomas F. Cummings, asked
the AAA to handle his case against AT&T
as a class arbitration.206 The association
staff agreed to take the first step toward
making the arbitration a class proceeding
by presenting Cummings’ request to an ar-
bitrator who would make that decision.207
A lawyer representing AT&T then wrote
an angry letter to AAA’s president, de-
manding that he block the move for a class
proceeding by overturning the staff deci-
sion to allow an arbitrator to decide that
issue. 
In a barely veiled threat, the letter cited the
JAMS decision four months earlier to
allow class arbitrations, and observed that,
as a result, JAMS “appears” to be losing
business as companies switch arbitration
providers.208 “To our knowledge, the AAA
has not seen an exodus of ADR [Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution] users similar to
that experienced by JAMS,” William J.
Nissen, the AT&T attorney wrote on
March 7, 2005. He suggested that AAA
clarify its policy so that companies that in-
clude arbitration clauses in their contracts
“can make an informed decision whether
to include the AAA in their clauses.”209
How the Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers
Public Citizen September 2007
46
His timing was ironic. Three days after
Nissen wrote the letter, JAMS yielded to
the pressure and announced that it was
abandoning its new policy on class arbitra-
tions.210
Nissen’s letter sparked an immediate re-
sponse from plaintiff Cummings. In a
court filing, he branded the letter “a clear
threat by AT&T to use its economic power,
and that of its law firm, to cause a mass
‘exodus of ADR users’ from AAA if the
decision of the AAA staff is not over-
turned.” Saying the AT&T “threat ... taints
the impartiality of the arbitration process,”
he asked the judge to vacate his arbitration
order and allow the case to proceed in
court.211
Three days after Cummings filed his mo-
tion, AAA also surrendered to the pressure
from AT&T and reversed the case man-
ager’s decision, blocking the possibility
that an arbitrator would allow the arbitra-
tion as a class proceeding.212
Subsequently, in May 2005, Judge John W.
Lungstrum denied the request to vacate his
arbitration order and hear the case in court,
saying “the court may not interfere with
the ongoing arbitration proceeding.”213
But he observed that the initial AAA staff
decision to send the request for a class
proceeding to an arbitrator appeared to
have been proper and agreed with the
plaintiff’s counsel that “the appearance has
been created that counsel for AT&T used
AT&T’s economic power to successfully
persuade the AAA to prematurely bend its
own rules.”214
State Court Vindicates Consumer Rights,
Overturns Class Action Ban
The Supreme Court of Washington State
emphasized the importance of class action
lawsuits in striking down a cell phone
company’s ban on the procedure in July
2007.
Cingular Wireless customers filed a class
action suit alleging that they had been
overcharged between $1 and $40 a month.
Citing the ban on class actions in the arbi-
tration clause of the standard Cingular
subscriber contract, a state trial court or-
dered individual arbitrations. The plaintiffs
appealed and the state Supreme Court
struck down the ban – and the entire arbi-
tration clause – and sent the case back to
the trial court.215
The Supreme Court concluded that the
class action waiver “effectively denies
large numbers of consumers the protection
of Washington’s Consumer Protection
Act” and “effectively exculpates Cingular
from liability for a whole class of wrong-
ful conduct. It is therefore unenforceable.
Since the arbitration clause itself provides
that if any part is found unenforceable, the
entire clause shall be void, there is no
basis to compel arbitration.”216
The court also made the following com-
pelling points about class action lawsuits
and Cingular’s ban – points that apply to
any class action waiver that is part of a
pre-dispute binding mandatory arbitration
clause imposed on consumers:
• “Without class actions, many meritori-
ous claims would never be brought.”
• The waiver “drastically forestalls at-
tempts to vindicate consumer rights.”
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It may have been no accident that
the major credit card companies moved at
the same time to impose binding manda-
tory arbitration on their customers, if the
allegations in an antitrust lawsuit filed in
federal court in New York against eight
credit card companies in 2005 are
correct.219
The suit suggests that it is also no
accident that the National Arbitration
Forum is perhaps the main arbitration
player helping credit card companies col-
lect debts from cardholders. 
At a time when NAF was marketing
its services to credit card companies, the
suit alleges, the firm was also involved in
helping the defendants and others encour-
age credit card companies to adopt
clauses requiring arbitration.
The antitrust suit, filed in New York
federal court, claimed that the defendants
conspired, through establishment of an
“arbitration coalition,” to impose an arbi-
tration requirement on their customers
beginning in 1998 and 1999.220 The suit
contained specific allegations about times
and dates of “arbitration coalition” meet-
ings and also alleged that a “Consumer
Class Action Working Group” met twice
“to consider methods to deflect consumer
class action litigation in light of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act.” 
The suit alleges that a major Wash-
ington law firm, Wilmer, Cutler, Picker-
ing Hale and Dorr LLP, hosted a meeting
in 1999 that was a prelude to formation of
the alleged coalition. The 1999 meeting
was attended by representatives of at least
seven companies and the agenda “in-
cluded a planned discussion about arbi-
tration clauses,” according to the
complaint filed in the suit.
“The meeting provided an opportu-
nity for Defendants and their co-conspira-
tors to conspire concerning the adoption
and implementation of arbitration clauses
on an industry-wide basis,” stated the
complaint.
Furthermore, the complaint stated
that at that time, only two of the meet-
Antitrust Allegations Leveled Against Credit Card Industry over 
Arbitration Agreements
• The Cingular waiver freed the firm of
“legal liability for any wrong where
the cost of pursuit outweighs the po-
tential amount of recovery.”
• “Claims as small as those in this case
are impracticable to pursue on an indi-
vidual basis even in small claims court,
and particularly in arbitration.” [Em-
phasis added.]
Emphasizing the one-sided nature of arbi-
tration clauses, the court wrote that “It ap-
pears that no claims from Washington
customers have been brought to arbitration
against Cingular in the past six years.”217
The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois
overturned the Cingular class action
waiver in 2006 on the grounds that it was
unconscionable.
“It is not unconscionable merely because it
is contained in an arbitration clause,” the
court ruled. “It is unconscionable because
it is contained in a contract of adhesion
that fails to inform the customer of the
cost to her of arbitration, and that does not
provide a cost-effective mechanism for in-
dividual customers to obtain a remedy for
the specific injury alleged in either a judi-
cial or an arbitral forum.”218
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ing’s co-sponsors, First USA and Ameri-
can Express used “arbitration clauses
containing class action bans.” American
Express’s arbitration clause had not taken
effect and Bank of America had an arbi-
tration clause that did not include a class
action ban. The complaint noted that
“None of the other Defendants had im-
posed arbitration clauses, in any form, on
their cardholders.”
At the meeting, the group allegedly
agreed to form an “Arbitration Coalition”
or “Arbitration Group” with an “express
purpose….to defend and foster arbitration
and promote the imposition of mandatory
clauses.” 
After the preliminary meeting, First
USA tried to identify other companies to
invite to the inaugural meeting of the
group. Among others, the firm asked
NAF to help identify likely participants.
“NAF did, in fact, identify and provide
First USA with the names of other com-
panies who might be willing to partici-
pate in the coalition.”
The complaint quoted from e-mails
and other documents and also cited spe-
cific meeting dates and described what
had occurred at those meetings. Among
other things, the suits alleged that:
• On Aug. 4, 1999, Wilmer Cutler Pick-
ering e-mailed coalition members
proposing a September meeting and
emphasizing that they should “con-
tinue to work together to develop ar-
bitration clauses.” The e-mail,
apparently referring to the earlier
meeting, said, “We agreed to take a
number of steps going forward, in-
cluding sharing our thoughts and ma-
terials (including FAQ responses,
customer information materials, and
legal briefs) on the issues regarding
arbitration that come up most fre-
quently and pose the greatest diffi-
culty.”
• On Sept. 29, 1999, the group met to
discuss arbitration clauses and the
“need to control class action litiga-
tion” and “explored the possibility of
all members of the coalition adopting
set criteria for their arbitration
clauses, which many of the Arbitra-
tion Coalition members had not yet
adopted as of that date.”
According to the suit, “the arbitration
clauses ultimately implemented by De-
fendants are materially identical because
they are mandatory clauses which ban
class actions.” 
The suit called NAF “the most
egregious example” of an arbitration
company that enforces “the conspiratori-
ally imposed class action ban” in arbitra-
tion clauses.
“It is the only for-profit arbitration
administrator used by Defendants,” the
suit said. “In handwritten notes of
Chase’s in-house counsel, written during
the September 20, 1999, Coalition meet-
ing, NAF was referred to as appearing to
be a ‘creditor’s tool.’  ” The suit added,
“NAF’s record on arbitration reveals an
inordinate tendency to favor defendants.”
The suit was dismissed in Septem-
ber 2006, when a judge ruled that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an an-
titrust case because their suit did not
claim that they had suffered actual harm
as a result of the alleged conspiracy.
Plaintiffs have appealed the dismissal.
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Beth Plowman was a victim of
identity theft but that didn’t stop MBNA
and a debt buyer, Asset Acceptance Inc.,
from taking her to arbitration to collect
more than $26,000 in principal and inter-
est rung up on her credit card account by
thieves. And, it didn’t stop NAF from
finding against her.
Plowman said her last use of the
MBNA card was on a business trip in
Lagos, Nigeria, in September 2000 when
she paid a hotel bill with it.221
After that, she never received an ac-
count statement again. Instead, she said,
in March 2001, an MBNA representative
contacted her and said she owed
$26,296.28 on the account. MBNA ex-
plained that a person claiming to be her
sister – Plowman says she has no sister –
called and had the billing address
changed to London. MBNA told her the
account was being used across Europe to
buy “sporting goods.”222
“I never received an account state-
ment with the fraudulent charges,” Plow-
man said in a letter to the Montgomery
County, Md., Circuit Court. “The account
statements were being sent to the crimi-
nals themselves at their request.”223
After changing the mailing address
based on the word of someone who ad-
mittedly was not the account holder,
MBNA failed to contact Plowman to tell
her of the charges in Europe and to verify
the change of address. “I would have
taken immediate action to cancel the
credit card,” she wrote. “Instead, they
waited for months before contacting
me.”224
Eventually MBNA’s calls stopped
and Plowman assumed the matter was
settled in her favor.225 Two years later,
her assumption was shattered.
“It is our pleasure to welcome you
as a new customer,” said a May 2, 2003,
letter from Asset Acceptance, a company
that buys debts and then relentlessly pur-
sues alleged debtors. It told Plowman she
had a past due balance of $26,296.28.226
Plowman disputed the debt in a let-
ter to Asset Acceptance, which had told
her it would provide “verification of the
debt” if she challenged it. Asset Accept-
ance never sent documentation on the
debt and claimed months later that it had
not received her letter. She mailed it
again and also faxed it.227
The letter didn’t matter. Asset Ac-
ceptance had Plowman in its sights and,
with visions of collecting $26,296.28, the
firm recruited NAF as a crucial ally. On
Aug. 27, 2003, Professor Marvin E. John-
son Esq., an NAF arbitrator, awarded
Asset Acceptance $27,240.73.228
On Feb. 3, 2004, well beyond the
deadline for Plowman to appeal an arbi-
tration decision, Asset Acceptance went
to court in Maryland seeking confirma-
tion of the award.229
Plowman hired a lawyer, Scott C.
Borison, who challenged the effort to
confirm the debt, arguing that Asset Ac-
ceptance had violated the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act, the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act and the Maryland Con-
sumer Debt Collection Act.230
The firm finally decided to settle
with Plowman after her lawyer’s vigor-
ous defense, dropping its effort to collect.
But she had to spend $2,000 in attorney
fees to get the debt collectors off her
back.231
Beth Plowman:
Identity Theft in Nigeria Follows her Home
Chapter III
Congressional Action on BMA and 
Credit Cards
Members of Congress have been hear-ing complaints from constituents
about the abusive practices of credit card
companies. Congress recently held several
hearings, which uncovered evidence that
credit card companies routinely bilk con-
sumers for millions of dollars in fees and
penalties, and that these charges are a
major profit center for the banking indus-
try. Clearly, a statutory remedy is needed.
Congressional committees held at least
five hearings on the various aspects of
credit cards, including shifting interest
rates, high fees and the teaser interest rates
that lure people into credit card accounts. 
At one hearing, an Ohio man served as a
poster child for abusive credit card com-
pany practices.232 Wesley Wannemacher
testified on March 7, 2007, before the Sen-
ate Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions. He began his journey into
credit-card hell when he opened a Chase
Bank account with a $3,000 limit in 2001
and soon exceeded the limit by $200,
charging his wedding expenses. He then
stopped using the card. He never used the
card again and struggled for more than
five years to pay a mounting debt as Chase
slapped him repeatedly with high interest
rates, late fees and 47 charges totaling
$1,500 for exceeding his card limit by
$200.
By February 2007, he had been billed
$10,700 and had made payments of
$6,300, nearly double the original charges,
and he still owed $4,400. After Wan-
nemacher agreed to testify, Chase decided
to cancel the debt. The company an-
nounced the decision and provided an
apology at the hearing. 
As unfair as binding mandatory arbitration
is to credit cardholders, it managed to
largely elude the spotlight that Capitol Hill
trained on the credit card industry until a
June 2007 hearing when the House Judici-
ary Committee Subcommittee on Com-
mercial and Administrative Law heard
moving testimony about the victims of
BMA.
A month later, legislation to fix the law on
binding mandatory arbitration was intro-
duced in the Senate as S. 1782 by Sen.
Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) and Assistant Ma-
jority Leader Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.)
and in the House as H.R. 3010 by Rep.
Hank Johnson (D-Ga.). The House bill has
14 co-sponsors.233 The legislation would
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“Every indication is that the imposed arbitration
clauses are nothing but a shield against legal ac-
countability by the credit card companies.” 
University of Chicago Law Review, 2006
amend the Federal Arbitration Act to out-
law pre-dispute binding mandatory arbitra-
tion in consumer, employment and
franchise contracts, along with statutes
that protect civil rights and contracts or
transactions between parties of unequal
bargaining power.234
As Feingold noted in introducing the bill,
arbitration “can be a fair and efficient way
to settle disputes.” But he added that it is
“a fair way to settle disputes between con-
sumers and lenders only when it is entered
into knowingly and voluntarily by both
parties to the dispute after the dispute has
arisen.”235
Feingold’s bill, in his own words, is in-
tended to “prevent a party with greater
bargaining power from forcing individuals
into arbitration through a contractual pro-
vision. It will ensure that citizens once
again have a true choice between arbitra-
tion and the traditional civil court
system.”236
Feingold’s bill was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, while Johnson’s
measure was directed to the House Judici-
ary Committee. No further action has yet
been taken on them – or on ten bills on
credit card reform that were introduced
this year and referred to various commit-
tees.
In March, the movie “Maxed Out,” which
was shown in the Capitol, offered the pub-
lic a scathing indictment of an industry
that inflicts exorbitant fees, uncon-
scionable charges and high interest rates
on the financially troubled after bombard-
ing them with alluring offers and teaser in-
terest rates.
The hearings and movie followed a Sep-
tember 2006 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report that suggested the
companies were increasingly relying on
penalty interest rates and fees to boost the
bottom line. The GAO found that while in-
terest rates on the whole are lower than
they were in 1990, credit card companies
use a complex structure of fees and inter-
est rates (sometimes three rates on the
same card, depending on the kind of bor-
rowing) and do a poor job of disclosure to
their customers. The GAO said that “the
increased revenues gained from penalty in-
terest and fees may be offsetting the gener-
ally lower amounts of interest that card
issuers collect from the majority of their
cardholders.”237
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., a George Washing-
ton Law School professor, told a House
subcommittee in April that:
• Credit card fees totaled $24 billion in
2004, an increase of 18 percent from
2003;
• Penalty fees totaled $17.1 billion in
2005, a 10-fold increase in 10 years;
• Penalty interest rates averaged 24.2
percent in 2005, an increase of more
than 10 percent from the previous
year.238
Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard law profes-
sor, put it bluntly in a January 2007 hear-
ing. “It is clear that the sweet spot is the
customer who stumbles and pays late fees
and high rates of interest,” Warren said.
“Nearly eight out of every ten dollars of
revenue comes from the customers who
cannot pay off their bills in full every
month.”239
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Despite the interest in credit cards and ar-
bitration on Capitol Hill, the prospects for
meaningful action are uncertain. As simple
as it is, the Feingold-Johnson legislation
faces a daunting array of opponents who
have shown they are ready to reach into
deep pockets for millions of dollars to de-
fend their interests on Capitol Hill.
Credit card companies and other firms in
the credit and finance industry have given
nearly $29 million in campaign funds to
members of Congress and candidates since
1990, according to the Center for Respon-
sive Politics.240
And the major credit card players send le-
gions of lobbyists to Capitol Hill to protect
them, spending more than $200 million on
the endeavor since 1998.241
The last time the industry relied on its fi-
nancial might was in 2005, when it pushed
the notoriously anti-consumer bankruptcy
bill through Congress.
Aware of the stiff opposition facing any
comprehensive bill, in June 2007, Rep.
Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.), who chairs the
Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit Subcommittee of the House Finan-
cial Services Committee, encouraged regu-
lators to “to enforce the laws that already
exist” and held a “credit card summit” to
find “a way to use private forces to keep
the spotlight on issuers and encourage best
practices.”242
Days after her summit, on Aug. 3, 2007,
Maloney announced her “‘Gold Standard’
Credit Card Principles,” saying she plans
to incorporate them into legislation.
Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), chairman of
the House Financial Services Committee,
said he hopes to move legislation by Octo-
ber.243
Arbitration was not mentioned in Mal-
oney’s principles, which included requir-
ing issuance of credit cards “on terms that
the individual can repay” by:
• Eliminating any-time, any-reason re-
pricing;
• Eliminating universal default, the prac-
tice of raising a cardholder’s interest
rate to the default rate if the customer
is late with a payment to another credi-
tor;
• Offering the option of a card with a
fixed rate for a fixed period of time;
and
• Providing cardholders notice of all rate
increases, including default and non-
default based increases, and the right
to cancel the card and pay off the bal-
ance at the original rate.244
Maloney also proposed that the companies
clearly explain account features, terms and
pricing; give customer notice and choice
on changes in terms; and encourage “re-
sponsible, successful credit use” by their
customers.
Even before Maloney issued her princi-
ples, Sen. Thomas R. Carper (D-Del.), a
member of the Senate Banking Commit-
tee, dismissed the possibility of legislation,
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A “Big Deal”: Top Contributors to 
Sen. Thomas R. Carper Since 1989
MBNA Corp $131,447
JPMorgan Chase & Co $109,929
Citigroup Inc $69,800
Source: Center for Responsive Politics.
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Campaign Contributions by Credit/Finance Industry 1990-2006
Election Total $ from $ from Soft Money $ to $ to % to % to
Cycle Rank $ Individuals PACs $ Dems Repubs Dems Repubs
2006* 47 $6,775,952 $2,653,378 $4,122,574 N/A $2,830,274 $3,881,008 42% 57% 
2004* 43 $8,762,353 $4,698,052 $4,064,301 N/A $3,316,560 $5,433,900 38% 62% 
2002 47 $7,870,032 $1,239,152 $3,328,938 $3,301,942 $3,005,441 $4,850,993 38% 62% 
2000 42 $10,148,126 $3,549,687 $2,558,398 $4,040,041 $3,234,164 $6,906,923 32% 68% 
1998 51 $4,698,402 $1,309,425 $2,205,918 $1,183,059 $1,371,696 $3,319,706 29% 71% 
1996 51 $4,662,184 $1,213,765 $1,746,947 $1,701,472 $1,488,119 $3,170,365 32% 68% 
1994 46 $3,441,687 $1,219,412 $1,337,933 $884,342 $1,624,407 $1,813,780 47% 53% 
1992 62 $1,896,003 $702,032 $655,803 $538,168 $963,854 $930,149 51% 49% 
1990 70 $731,400 $216,753 $514,647 N/A $418,354 $312,946 57% 43% 
Total 50 $48,986,139 $16,801,656 $20,535,459 $11,649,024 $18,252,869 $30,619,770 37% 63%
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
saying that banking industry opposition
makes it “hard to get anything passed
today.” Instead, he latched on to Mal-
oney’s idea for a set of voluntary “best
practices” by the card companies.245
“In my state, credit cards are a big deal,”
said Carper, who sits on the Senate bank-
ing committee, which has jurisdiction over
the industry.246 His political donations [see
previous page] reflect both the signifi-
cance of the state of Delaware for com-
mercial interests and his position on the
banking committee.
Overall campaign finance spending by the
credit and finance industry has also been
substantial, judging from the following in-
formation from the Center for Responsive
Politics.247
MBNA was the largest single contributor
to George W. Bush’s first presidential
campaign – both through its PAC and its
employees.
MBNA Campaign Contributions by Source of Funds 1990-2004
Election Total $ from $ from Soft Money Soft Money 
Cycle $ Individuals PACs $ (Indivs) $ (Orgs.)
2004 $1,542,972 $796,847 $746,125 $0 $0
2002 $1,507,569 $355,475 $511,500 $594 $640,000
2000 $3,691,705 $1,759,800 $696,000 $500,000 $735,905
1998 $1,358,850 $529,850 $574,000 $0 $255,000
1996 $834,605 $186,701 $465,404 $25,000 $157,500
1994 $876,555 $670,423 $205,632 $0 $500
1992 $293,750 $133,750 $60,000 $0 $100,000
Total $10,106,006 $4,432,846 $3,258,661 $525,594 $1,888,905
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
MBNA Campaign Contributions by Recipient of Funds 1990-2004
Election Total $ to $ to % to % to 
Cycle $ Dems Repubs Dems Repubs
2004 $1,542,972 $396,672 $1,141,050 26% 74%
2002 $1,507,569 $407,075 $1,100,494 27% 73%
2000 $3,691,705 $553,765 $3,137,940 15% 85%
1998 $1,358,850 $141,050 $1,217,800 10% 90%
1996 $834,605 $122,350 $712,255 15% 85%
1994 $876,555 $58,750 $817,805 7% 93%
1992 $293,750 $53,000 $240,750 18% 82%
Total $10,106,006 $1,732,662 $8,368,094 17% 83%
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
In 2000, the MBNA donations to Bush to-
taled $240,675. In 2004, MBNA fell to
No. 6 on the Bush hit parade even though
contributions from the firm increased by
48 percent, to $356,350.
Overall, MBNA ranks 62nd among Ameri-
can corporations in its political giving. Its
contribution record over seven election cy-
cles is shown in the charts on the previous
page.248
Edward C. Anderson, managing director of
the National Arbitration Forum, has also
been a generous campaign contributor
over the years, giving $26,970 to political
candidates, mostly Republicans.249
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Top 10 Congressional Recipients of Contributions
from the Credit Finance Industry in the 2006 Election Cycle
(current members only)
Rank Candidate Amount
1 Sen. Tim Johnson (D-S.D.) $95,300
2 Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) $83,330
3. John Boehner (R-Ohio) $75,000
4. Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.) $74,620 
5. Rep. Richard Baker (R-La.) $72,750
6. Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) $70,343
7. Rep. Paul Kanjorski (D-Pa.) $67,089
8 Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Neb.) $65,050
9. Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) $64,020
10. Rep Patrick Tiberi
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In October 2006, CACV of Col-
orado LLC, a debt buyer, filed a petition
in California Superior Court in Orange
County to confirm an arbitration award of
$10,100.64 against Javier Beltran for al-
legedly defaulting on an MBNA credit
card debt. Beltran never was knowingly
party to an agreement to arbitrate with
MBNA.250
According to Beltran’s sworn decla-
ration filed with his response to the
CACV petition, he is from Mexico, did
not complete third grade and does not
read English. When his brother died in
August 2000, he went to a Fresno funeral
home, Funeraria La Paz, and arranged for
a casket, burial suit, burial service and
headstone at a cost of $3,700. He had
only $1,200, so the funeral home
arranged for him to finance the balance.
Although the discussion was in
Spanish, he signed a contract written in
English. He was not told that the interest
rate on the $2,500 balance was 26.99 per-
cent. He said he was making payments to
MBNA Consumer Services Inc., but that
he was never mailed a credit card, and
was never, that he was aware, given a line
of credit. He later learned that the head-
stone had not been put on the grave. He
called the funeral home, which said it
wanted more money for the headstone.
He claims that MBNA Consumer Serv-
ices began to automatically deduct pay-
ments from his checking account –
without his permission.251
Beltran said he was unaware of the
arbitration proceedings and did not re-
ceive the official service of arbitration
documents. The signature on the UPS
proof of service is not his.252
In December 2006, after CACV
went to court seeking confirmation of the
arbitration award, Beltran was served pa-
pers by a man who told him, in Spanish,
that they were about “a credit card that
you owe.” He said they were in English
and he could not read them, so he sought
legal help.253
Aurora Dawn Harris, Beltran’s
lawyer, said in a declaration filed with
her Feb. 8, 2007, response to the CAVC
petition that she searched the NAF’s
quarterly report for April-June 2006 and
found that Urs Martin Lauchli, the arbi-
trator who signed the award against Bel-
tran on April 26, 2006, “‘reviewed’ and
decided 37 other CACV cases against
consumers on April 26, 2006.”254
After Beltran responded to CACV’s
petition, the firm filed an affidavit two
days before a Feb. 28, 2007, hearing that
changed key facts of the case. It said that
Beltran had a credit line, not a credit card
account, that the credit line was estab-
lished with Bank of America, not MBNA,
and that Bank of America sold the debt to
CACV of Colorado.255
In May, a judge dismissed the
CACV of Colorada request for confirma-
tion of the arbitration award, ruling that
the firm “has failed to present sufficient,
admissible evidence that Javier D. Bel-
tran entered into an agreement that con-
tained an arbitration clause.”
However, the judge, Linda Marks,
refused to vacate the arbitration award.256
A Christian Science Monitor story
containing the sad details of Beltran’s
case ran in July 2007, shortly after he set-
tled. Beltran’s debt has been wiped out
and he has been promised that his credit
report will be repaired.257
Javier Beltran: Lack of MBNA Account Does Not
Dissuade NAF
Chapter IV 
What Consumers Can Do to Fight BMA and
Protect Themselves
Consumers can take some measures toprotect themselves. They should be
aware that the fine print in consumer con-
tracts may include a clause stripping away
their rights and forcing them into expen-
sive binding mandatory arbitration. Once a
service or product is provided, consumers
have few options.
To avoid being trapped by a binding
mandatory arbitration clause, consumers
should: 
• Use Credit Cards with Care:
o Read all credit card terms to dis-
cover whether the policy contains a
binding mandatory arbitration
agreement. If it does, terminate the
card when you can and cite the
BMA clause as your reason.
o If obtaining a new credit card that
includes BMA, sign an arbitration
opt-out if one is available or strike
the clause from the contract and
initial the change.
o Try to obtain a credit card that does
not require binding mandatory ar-
bitration. AARP says its cards do
not require the clause. Some small
banks and credit unions also do not
require arbitration clauses.
o Pay attention. If you receive a
change-of-terms document in the
mail, read it carefully. Check the
contents of the envelope accompa-
nying the monthly statement to as-
sure there has not been a change. If
the proposed change is unclear, call
the card issuer and demand an ex-
planation. Any changes that you do
not approve can be rejected by not
using your card again.
o Reduce credit card debt as much as
possible to avoid costly fees,
penalties and credit disputes.
• Examine All Consumer Contracts
for Arbitration Clauses:
o Read all of the fine print before
signing a contract – especially one
for a credit card, mortgage, install-
ment loan or new car.
o If applying for an installment loan
or buying a new car, make sure the
loan agreement (and, in the case of
a car, the purchase agreement and
loan agreement) does not include
an arbitration clause. If it does,
opt-out or walk away from the
deal. Consider financing the car
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“I have not yet found anything unbiased about
the NAF.”
Rochelle Guznack,
Consumer lawyer, Plymouth, Mich.
through a credit union that does not
require BMA.
o If you are looking for a mortgage,
make sure the lender does not re-
quire BMA. Seek a mortgage that
qualifies for a Fannie Mae or Fred-
die Mac loan. Neither organization
allows BMA.
• Put Up a Fight:
o If you receive a notice that a com-
pany has filed an arbitration case
against you, do not ignore it, even
if you know that there is a mistake.
Respond immediately in writing
and send the response by a method
that requires a signed delivery re-
ceipt. If you do not get a response
to your response, do not assume
that your explanation has been ac-
cepted. Demand a response. Also,
seek legal help. The National Asso-
ciation of Consumer Advocates
(NACA), a nationwide organiza-
tion of more than 1,000 attorneys
who represent and have repre-
sented hundreds of thousands of
victims of fraudulent, abusive and
predatory business practices, may
be able to help you find a lawyer.
Go to the NACA Web site at
www.naca.net and click on “find
an attorney” on the home page.
You can also contact NACA at
(202) 452-1989.
o Help organizations like Public Citi-
zen (www.citizen.org), the
StopBMA Coalition (www.giveme-
backmyrights.com) and the Ameri-
cans for Fairness in Lending
coalition (www.affil.org) to ban
binding mandatory arbitration.
Support efforts in Congress to ex-
empt consumer and employment
contracts from binding mandatory
arbitration.
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Appendix A
A Brief History of the Move to BMA
The trend toward widespread use ofbinding mandatory arbitration in con-
sumer lending, business contracts, sales
transactions and employment, among other
things, began with a 1984 Supreme Court
decision that some scholars view as deeply
flawed.
In a 6-3 decision in Southland Corp. et al.
v. Keating, the Court said that in adopting
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925,
“Congress declared a national policy fa-
voring arbitration” by barring the states
from requiring court adjudication of dis-
putes “that the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.”258
That conclusion rested on a huge assump-
tion. “Since the overwhelming proportion
of civil litigation in this country is in the
state courts, Congress could not have in-
tended to limit the Arbitration Act to dis-
putes subject only to federal-court
jurisdiction,” the majority opinion said.
“In creating a substantive rule applicable
in state as well as federal courts, Congress
intended to foreclose state legislative at-
tempts to undercut the enforceability of ar-
bitration agreements.”
In dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
wrote that the decision “utterly fails to rec-
ognize the clear congressional intent un-
derlying the FAA. Congress intended to
require federal, not state, courts to respect
arbitration agreements.”
She concluded, “Today’s decision is un-
faithful to congressional intent, unneces-
sary, and, in light of the FAA’s antecedents
and the intervening contraction of federal
power, inexplicable.
“Although arbitration is a worthy alterna-
tive to litigation, today’s exercise in judi-
cial revisionism goes too far,” O’Connor
wrote.259
David S. Schwartz, an associate professor
at the University of Wisconsin Law
School, is a fierce critic of Southland. In
2004, he wrote, “In deciding whether the
FAA created substantive law that preempts
state limitations on arbitration agreements,
Southland should have been guided by the
original intent of the FAA. Instead, South-
land flouted the FAA’s historical record,
which showed as clearly as possible, given
the lack of explicit mention of preemption,
that Congress intended the FAA to be a
procedural statute that neither applies in
state court nor preempts state law.”260
Since that decision, federal courts have
shown great deference to arbitration, rely-
ing on Southland and subsequent decisions
to toss out court challenges to arbitration
when state court decisions have curbed its
use.
In a 1987 case involving the securities in-
dustry, the Supreme Court said the FAA
required courts to “rigorously enforce arbi-
tration agreements.” The court said that in
cases where a party to an arbitration agree-
ment asserts that its rights are being vio-
lated, it must show “that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.”261
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The Supreme Court followed up in 1995
by invalidating state laws that outlawed
written pre-dispute arbitration agreements,
saying that the Federal Arbitration Act
“has the basic purpose of overcoming judi-
cial hostility to arbitration agreements and
applies in both federal diversity cases and
state courts, where it pre-empts state
statutes invalidating such agreements.”262
In 2006, the Supreme Court again deferred
to arbitration, overruling a Florida
Supreme Court decision that said a court,
not an arbitrator, must make the decision
when a party to a contract that includes an
arbitration clause challenges the legality of
the entire contract.
Borrowers had filed a class action lawsuit
against Buckeye Check Cashing Inc.,
charging that the payday lender’s high in-
terest rates made their borrowing agree-
ment illegal. Buckeye said the issue should
be decided in arbitration.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that it
would violate state policy and law to en-
force an arbitration agreement in a con-
tract being challenged as unlawful.263
The U.S. Supreme Court in Buckeye
Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna over-
turned the Florida decision, saying,
“Whether the challenge is brought in fed-
eral or state court, a challenge to the valid-
ity of the contract as a whole, and
notspecifically to the arbitration clause,
must go to the arbitrator.”264
In his 2004 article, Professor Schwartz
wrote, “Southland and its progeny are the
result of bad statutory interpretation and
even worse federalism. The historical evi-
dence demonstrates that Congress never
intended to preempt state law regulating
arbitration agreements. To the contrary, the
best interpretation of the FAA is that ...
federal courts should normally be bound
by state-law restrictions on arbitration en-
forcement.”
“The evidence against Southland is so
strong that it seems that no one defends it
on the merits anymore: Southland lives on
only because of the Court’s reluctance to
overrule a statutory interpretation prece-
dent, its desire to spread arbitration far and
wide, or a combination of the two. Neither
justifies continuing the regime of South-
land’s preemption of state law.”265
Gradually, following the series of deci-
sions, U.S. companies began in the late
1990s to force customers to agree in ad-
vance to binding mandatory arbitration.
By the end of 2001, nine of the top ten
credit card companies had told their cus-
tomers of the change, usually with oft-ig-
nored bill-stuffers.266 Making the change
were Capital One, Citibank, Discover,
Bank One/First USA, American Express,
MBNA America, Bank of America, U.S.
Bancorp, and Household.267
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Appendix B
Statistical Analysis
Summary of California Arbitrator Steven Bromberg Cases 
July 2003- June 2005
No. of Business Consumer Business Consumer
Quarter Cases Wins Wins Other Wins Wins
2003 Q3 21 20 0 1 95.2% 0.0%
2003 Q4 77 77 0 0 100.0% 0.0%
2004 Q1 27 27 0 0 100.0% 0.0%
2004 Q2 30 30 0 0 100.0% 0.0%
2004 Q3 39 35 2 2 89.7% 5.1%
2004 Q4 100 95 4 1 95.0% 4.0%
2005 Q1 93 91 0 2 97.8% 0.0%
2005 Q2 134 129 3 2 96.3% 2.2%
Total 521 504 9 8 96.7% 1.7%
Source: National Arbitration Forum
Summary of California Arbitrator Steven Bromberg MBNA Cases 
July 2003- June 2005
No. of Business Consumer Business Consumer
Quarter Cases Wins Wins Other Wins Wins
2003 Q3 13 13 0 0 100.0% 0.0%
2003 Q4 27 27 0 0 100.0% 0.0%
2004 Q1 10 10 0 0 100.0% 0.0%
2004 Q2 5 5 0 0 100.0% 0.0%
2004 Q3 26 23 1 2 88.5% 3.8%
2004 Q4 50 49 1 0 98.0% 2.0%
2005 Q1 80 78 0 2 97.5% 0.0%
2005 Q2 65 62 2 1 95.4% 3.1%
Total 276 267 4 5 96.7% 1.4%
Source: National Arbitration Forum
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Amount Awarded
Claimant Amount Claimed To Claimant
1 Bank One Delaware $5,580 $5,580
2 Bank One Delaware $7,866 $7,866
3 Bank One Delaware $6,728 $6,728
4 Bank One Delaware $6,719 $6,719
5 Bank One Delaware $6,622 $6,622
6 Bank One Delaware $7,929 $7,929
7 Bank One Delaware $5,348 $5,348
8 Bank One Delaware $4,507 $4,507
9 Bank One Delaware $3,764 $3,764
10 Bank One Delaware $3,192 $3,192
11 Bank One Delaware $6,704 $6,704
12 Bank One Delaware $7,953 $7,953
13 Sarasota CCM Inc. $21,960 $21,960
14 Bank One Delaware $10,607 $10,607
15 Bank One Delaware $5,009 $5,009
16 MBNA $28,759 $28,759
17 MBNA $11,114 $11,114
18 MBNA $8,198 $8,198
19 MBNA $5,983 $5,983
20 Bank One Delaware $18,094 $18,094
21 Bank One Delaware $7,680 $7,680
22 Bank One Delaware $6,032 $6,032
23 Bank One Delaware $6,770 $6,770
24 MBNA $35,712 $35,712
25 Bank One Delaware $10,260 $10,260
26 Bank One Delaware $12,256 $12,256
27 Bank One Delaware $11,332 $11,332
28 Bank One Delaware $12,699 $12,699
29 Bank One Delaware $13,158 $13,158
30 Bank One Delaware $10,383 $10,383
31 Bank One Delaware $3,496 $3,496
32 Bank One Delaware $13,369 $13,369
33 Bank One Delaware $15,772 $15,772
34 Bank One Delaware $16,005 $16,005
35 Bank One Delaware $16,139 $16,139
36 Bank One Delaware $9,918 $9,918
37 Bank One Delaware $9,444 $9,444
38 Bank One Delaware $8,850 $8,850
39 Bank One Delaware $13,153 $13,153
40 Bank One Delaware $13,137 $13,137
Total $428,201 $428,201
Source: National Arbitration Forum
Cases Handled By Arbitrator Steven Bromberg, Oct. 1, 2003
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Amount Awarded
Claimant Amount Claimed To Claimant
1 Advantage Assets Inc.
(assignee of MBNA) $16,577 $16,577
2 Advantage Assets Inc.
(assignee of MBNA) $16,280 $16,280
3 Advantage Assets Inc.
(assignee of MBNA) $15,562 $15,562
4 MBNA $12,783 $12,782
5 MBNA $14,610 $14,610
6 MBNA $33,090 $33,089
7 MBNA $8,294 $8,294
8 MBNA $13,730 $13,730
9 MBNA $14,630 $14,630
10 MBNA $16,532 $16,532
11 MBNA $22,194 $22,194
12 MBNA $15,465 $15,465
13 MBNA $3,366 $3,366
14 MBNA $7,541 $7,541
15 MBNA $26,938 $26,938
16 MBNA $3,893 $3,893
17 MBNA $13,167 $13,167
18 MBNA $8,751 $8,751
19 MBNA $6,987 $6,987
20 MBNA $16,253 $16,253
21 MBNA $16,372 $16,372
22 MBNA $16,117 $16,117
23 MBNA $28,391 $28,271
24 MBNA $5,931 $5,931
25 MBNA $8,701 $8,701
26 MBNA $14,211 $14,141
27 MBNA $3,768 $3,767
28 MBNA $9,786 $9,786
29 MBNA $41,072 $41,072
30 MBNA $6,976 $6,976
31 MBNA $27,639 $27,639
32 MBNA $4,155 $4,155
33 MBNA $6,313 $6,313
34 MBNA $17,212 $17,212
35 MBNA $6,156 $6,156
36 MBNA $10,705 $10,704
37 MBNA $9,813 $9,813
Total $519,964 $519,774
Source: National Arbitration Forum
Cases Handled By Arbitrator Steven Bromberg, May 16, 2005
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At least 10 bills that would bring needed
reform to the credit card industry have
been introduced in Congress this year –
bills with titles that hold promise for the
consumer:
• S. 1782, the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007, introduced July 12, 2007, by
Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) and re-
ferred to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.
• H.R. 3010, the Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, introduced July 12, 2007, by
Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.). Referred
to the House Judiciary Committee.
• S. 1925, Student Card Protection Act
of 2007, introduced Aug 1, 2007, by
Sen. Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) and four co-
sponsors  and referred to the Senate
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee.
• H.R. 3347, Student Card Protection
Act of 2007, introduced Aug 2, 2007,
by Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.) and
referred to the House Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
• S. 1395 Stop Unfair Practices in Credit
Cards Act of 2007, introduced May 15,
2007, by Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
and referred to the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Commit-
tee.
• H.R. 873, the Credit Card Payment Fee
Act of 2007, introduced Feb. 7, 2007
by Reps. Gary Ackerman (D-N.Y.) and
Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.), referred to
the Financial Services Committee.
• S. 1309 and H.R. 2146, Universal De-
fault Prohibition Act of 2007, intro-
duced May 3, 2007, by Sen. Jon Tester
(D-Mont.) in the Senate and by Rep.
Keith Ellison (D-Minn.) and 27 co-
sponsors in the House. Referred to the
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee and the House Fi-
nancial Services Committee.
• H.R. 1461, Credit CARD Act of 2007,
introduced March 9, 2007, by Rep.
Mark Udall (D-Colo.) and 33 co-spon-
sors, referred to the House Financial
Services Committee.
• H.R. 3421, Credit Protection Act of
2007, introduced Aug. 3, 2007, by
Rep. Nita M. Lowey (D-N.Y.) and re-
ferred to the House Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
• S. 1176, Credit Card Minimum Pay-
ment Warning Act of 2007, introduced
April 20, 2007, by Sen. Daniel Akaka
(D-Hawaii) and three co-sponsors and
referred to the Senate Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs Committee.
• H.R. 1510, Credit Card Repayment
Act of 2007, introduced March 13,
2007, by Rep. David E. Price (D-N.C.)
and 15 co-sponsors and referred to the
House Financial Services Committee.
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